Buffalo Law Review
Volume 32

Number 2

Article 4

4-1-1983

Open Government Laws and Public Employment Provisions
Robert G. Vaughn
American University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert G. Vaughn, Open Government Laws and Public Employment Provisions, 32 Buff. L. Rev. 465
(1983).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol32/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS AND PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
PROVISIONS
ROBERT G. VAUGHN*
INTRODUCTION

In the 1960s and 1970s federal and state legislatures enacted a
number of laws which provide for public access to inf6rmation col-

lected and used by the government and to the decision-making
process itself. These open government laws' include the federal
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),2 the Privacy Act,s the Gov* A. Allen King Scholar and Professor of Law, The American University.
The author thanks Elisabeth Goodman for her assistance in the preparation of this Article. The author also thanks Dean Thomas Buergenthal and the Dean's Advisory Council of
The American University Law School for providing the research grant which aided this
project.
1. Open government laws seek to guarantee public access by members of the public to
certain documents and records or to the decision-making process of their government. These
laws all seek the same end-open government-but the provisions of each particular statute
vary substantially in their history and approach. See, e.g., Wickham, Let the Sun Shine!
Open-meeting Legislation Can Be Our Key to Closed Doors in State and Local Government, 68 Nw. U.L. Rav. 480 (1973); Note, Texas Open Meetings Act Has PotentiallyBroad
Coverage But Suffers From Inadequate Enforcement Provisions, 49 Tax. L. REv. 764
(1972); Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The PressFights for the Right to Know, 75 HAv. L.
Rav. 1199 (1962); N. DORSEN, P. BENDER, B. NEu.ORNE, & S. LAW, POLITICAL AND Cvm
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 387-90 (4th ed. 1979).
2. The best known open government law is the Federal Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1982)). The Act was amended extensively in 1974, Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502,
88 Stat. 1561 (1974). The FOIA is a document and records law, while it grants access to
goverment documents and records, it does not require the government to prepare materials
that do not exist or to summarize existing records. The Act applies to all agencies within the
executive branch except members of the president's immediate personal staff whose function is to advise and assist the president. Access must be granted to any person without a
showing of need. The privacy exemptions of the FOIA, however, allow for consideration of
the identity of the requester. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
Under the FOIA, government documents and records must be made available unless
they fall under one of nine exemptions justifying withholding. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9)
(1982). Therefore, while the FOIA codifies the general policy that government documents
and records are public, several important exceptions exist. The broadly drawn exemptions
have generated considerable litigation, and judicial interpretation of the first, third, and
seventh exemptions have motivated congressional amendments. Id. § 552 (b)(1), (3), (7).
See generally, O'REiLLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: PROCEDURES, FoRMs, AND THE
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ermnent in the Sunshine Act, 4 the Federal Advisory Committee
LAW, §§ 11, 13, 17 (1977) [hereinafter FEDERAL INFORMATION DisCLOSURE].
By providing access to government documents and records, the FOIA seeks to give citizens the opportunity to understand and evaluate the actions of government officials. Knowledgeable citizens are better able to criticize governmental policy. Furthermore, the potential
for close examination of the conduct of government officials has the salutory influence of
encouraging honest and efficient government. See Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CH. L. REv. 761, 804 (1967); Kramer & Weinberg, The Freedom of
Information Act, 63 GEo. L.J. 49, 49 (1974); Comment, Development Under the Freedom of
InformationAct - 1980, 1981 DuKE L.J. 213, 214.
3. Like the FOIA, the Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1897 (codified
at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982)), is a document and records law, but it varies substantially from
the FOIA. The Privacy Act grants an individual access to his or her own records; the general
public cannot secure access to others' records through the Act. The Privacy Act covers only
documents and records that are part of a system of records maintained by an agency and
containing information about an individual from which "information is retrieved by the
name of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol or other identifying particular assigned to the individual." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5) (1982). The Act applies to all agencies
in the federal executive branch because the Privacy Act adopts the definition of agency
contained in FOIA. Compare id. § 552(e) with § 552a(a)(1).
The Act, however, does more than grant access to records; it also controls the acquisition, content, dissemination and use of information collected under the Act. Id, § 552a(e).
The Act provides a procedure whereby an individual can amend his or her record and pro.
vides the right to seek redress should the agency fail to grant such an amendment. Id. §
552a(g). The Privacy Act contains broad exemptions, id. § 552a(j), and several specific ones,
id. § 552a(k). These exemptions embody policies sometimes different from those contained
in the FOIA. Through these various provisions, the Privacy Act seeks to manage and to
control the vast amount of information which government agencies collect regarding individuals. The Act reflects congressional concern with the potential for abuse and the influence
that information practices could have on the political process.
4. Unlike the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, the Government in the
Sunshine Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-405, 90 Stat. 1242 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1982))
[hereinafter "Sunshine Act"], is not a document and records law. Rather, it provides access
to the meetings of certain federal agencies. The Sunshine Act covers all agencies "headed by
a collegial body composed of two or more individual members, a majority of whom are appointed to such position by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate and any
subdivision thereof authorized to act on behalf of the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(1) (1982).
The phrase "to such position" refers only to the term "collegial body" and thus members
must have been appointed and confirmed for the position on the specific "collegial body."
Symons v. Chrysler Corp. Loan Guarantee Rd., 670 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1981). While the
Sunshine Act provides access to meetings, it does not provide a right to participate, nor does
it require that a meeting be held. See Communications Systems v. F.C.C., 595 F.2d 797
(D.C. Cir. 1978). The Sunshine Act contains ten exemptions, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(1)-(10)
(1982), including seven contained in the FOIA. Compare id. § 552(b) (2), (3), (4), (6), (7) (8)
with § 552b(c) (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), (8). Since the purpose of the Sunshine Act is to allow
citizen observation of the deliberative process, it contains no exemption for the deliberative
process as does the FOIA. Additional exemptions not contained in the FOIA respond to
particular needs relating to government deliberations including the need to close meetings
regarding litigation or arbitration, id. § 552b(c)(10). The Sunshine Act imposes procedural
and notice requirements for open meetings and extensive procedures for closed ones. Re-
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Act,5 and similar state laws.6 During this period, the same legislative bodies also substantially modified the existing laws regulating
public sector collective bargaining, appointment, discipline, protection of "whistleblowers," and conflicts of interest. Examples of
these modifications are found in the Civil Service Reform Act of
19787 and the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. 8
cordkeeping requirements, id. § 552b(f)(1), and the right to judicial review, id. § 552b(h),
serve to protect access to agency deliberations.
The Sunshine Act rests upon the same premise as the FOTA: public evaluation of government decisions should be encouraged to enhance the accountability of government employees. The Sunshine Act applies this policy to the deliberative process. The FOIA grants access to the deliberative records while the Sunshine Act grants access to the process. Because
it applies only to multi-headed agencies, the Sunshine Act has substantially less scope than
the FOIA or the Privacy Act.
5. Like the Sunshine Act, the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), Pub. L. No.
92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 1-12 (1982)), is an open meeting provision, but its
genesis lies in the difficulty of structuring the process by which the government obtains
advice and recommendations from persons outside of government. FACA focuses upon advisory committees, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 3(2), 5 (1982). The Act seeks to structure the advisory
committee process through reporting requirements, limitations on the term of an advisory
committee, special procedures for the establishment of such committees, requirements for
supervision and control by government employees, and recordkeeping requirements. Id. §
5(a)-(b)(7). The Act seeks to open advisory committee meetings to the public, and to this
end mandates notice and access. Id. § 10(a)(1)-(3). The FACA also seeks to inform citizens
of the role private advice and recommendations plays in government decisions. Citizen access and a desire to keep governmental decision making separate from private influences not
properly channeled through agency procedures motivates the Act.
6. See infra notes 12-14, 201-03, 215, 239-42, 245, 250, 258, 278.
7. Watergate and the constitutional crisis which arose during the Nixon presidency
starkly demonstrated the need for fair administration, efficiency, and legislative control of
the public service. Fairly read, the investigations of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities demonstrated how President Nixon would have used the public
service illegally for personal, political purposes and illustrated the inadequacy of mechanisms to control abuse. The lessons of the Nixon years combined with renewed concerns
about the efficiency of the Civil Service to produce the proposals of the Carter Administration resulting in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1202.
The Civil Service Reform Act sought to implement two conflicting policies. First, the Act
sought to increase the protection of employees and of the public service from manipulation
and abuse. To accomplish this, the Act prohibited certain practices including political referrals of candidates, 5 U.S.C. § 2301(a)(8)(B), discrimination for non-job-related reasons, id. §
2302(b)(10), and coercion of political activities, id. § 2302(b)(3) (1982). The Act articulated
the procedural rights of employees facing disciplinary actions, id. § 7513, and placed the
resolution of major disciplinary actions in an independent quasi-judicial agency, id. §§ 1201,
1205. Congress established collective bargaining rights for federal employees, id. § 7101, and
created an independent labor relations authority to oversee the collective bargaining process, id. § 7104. In addition, the Act established an Office of Special Counsel charged with
the responsibility to ensure that personnel authority was not abused, id. §§ 1204, 1205.
Second, the Act sought to increase management flexibility. The Act created a core'of
senior employees over which agency management would have greater flexibility of appoint-
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Neither the newly created open government laws nor the recently modified public employment statutes clearly address the relationship between the two bodies of law.9 Consequently, many
ment, assignment, pay, and removal, id. §§ 3132(a)(2) (Senior Executive Service position),
3131 (Senior Executive Service). Middle level managers were placed under merit pay provisions, and the Act implemented a performance evaluation plan that more closely tied advancement and discipline to performance, id. § 4312. The Act eased standards for removal
or demotion of an employee for unsatisfactory performance, id. § 4303. Together, these provisions attempted to make managers accountable for the performance of their programs
while giving them the managerial authority needed to direct those programs. Combined with
these provisions was the creation of an Office of Personnel Management to aid and advise
federal agencies and to decentralize personnel authority within the federal government, id.
§§ 1101-1103.
The interplay of these two policies within the Act has created conflict and uncertainty.
Moreover, the balancing of these conflicting policies depends upon expectations concerning
institutional relationships and performance that have not always been met. The Act emphasized, however, personal accountability as an important method of accomplishing both
policies.
8. Pub. L. No., 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as amended in scattered sections of tits.
2, 5, 18, 28 & 39 U.S.C.) (Supp. H - Supp. IV 1980).
9. The failure to address the relationship between the two stems perhaps from the significant differences in their nature and history. Public employment laws are less coherent
than open government provisions, and the policies and goals of public employment laws are,
accordingly, more difficult to discern. Unifying patterns nevertheless exist, and an understanding of these patterns requires an analysis of the historical development of these provisions and of specific pieces of legislation.
Systematic attempts to regulate public employment occupy nearly one hundred years of
American history from the Pendleton Act of 1883 to the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.
During that period Congress enacted a number of laws concerning appointment, pay, discipline, loyalty and security, conflicts of interest, personnel actions, fringe benefits, occupational health and safety, veterans preference, restrictions on the political activities of public
employees, equal employment opportunity, collective bargaining, senior civil servants, and
protection of whistleblowers. Today, public employment law represents an amalgam of these
provisions, reflecting different judgments regarding the need for regulation of varying aspects of public employment. While these enactments represent judgments of particular historical periods, they share common perspectives and principles.
The Pendleton Act symbolized the beginning of the modern civil service and three historical forces representing principles that have become important parts of public employment law. First, the Pendleton Act resulted from the attempts of reformers to alter a corrupt system of patronage that was perceived as a threat to democracy itself. Public
employment law continues to embody the principle that the public service should facilitate
fair administration of the laws. Second, business concepts of efficiency and burgeoning government regulation increased the need for competency in the public service. Efficient administration remains a guiding principle of public employment law. Third, the Pendleton
Act illustrated the struggle between the president and Congress for control of the civil
service.
Congress passed a number of laws between 1883 and 1978 dealing with public employment, but none of these statutes systematically attempted reform. Many simply represented
reaction to specific problems. An examination of some of these provisions illustrates not
only their idiosyncratic characteristics but also their relationship to the principles guiding
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conflicts have emerged in effectuating the policies incorporated
the more systematic enactments.
The Pendleton Act primarily addressed the merit selection of federal employees through
competitive examination. Soon after passage of the Pendleton Act, Congress recognized the
need to protect employees appointed by merit selection from arbitrary removal. Without
such protection, the reforms built around merit selection might crumble. In 1912, Congress
passed the Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912, § 6, 37 Stat. 539 (current version at 5 U.S.C. §
7513 (1982)), which provided that no person appointed by competitive examination can be
removed from his position except for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.
In addition, the Act required a government agency to give the employee reasonable notice
and a reasonable time to reply, as well as the right to respond in writing with supporting
documents. The Civil Service Commission developed procedures for the review of agency
action and slowly developed an administrative mechanism to accomplish the review. See
discussion at Guttman, The Development and Exercise of Appellate Powers in Adverse
Action Appeals, 19 AM. U.L. REv. 323, 329-40 (1970).
Congress further established procedural rights for veterans in the Veterans Preference
Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 387, repealed by Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 652 (1966); see Guttman,
supra, at 324. The Act specified in greater detail the procedures with which an agency must
comply in disciplining veterans and provided the right to appeal to the Civil Service Commission. While these modifications rested upon a desire to benefit veterans following World
War II, the modifications meshed with those provided in the Lloyd-LaFollette Act. These
and other legislative initiatives concerning the rights of federal employees subject to discipline implement the policies of the Pendleton Act. The Civil Service Reform Act completed
the development by establishing a statutory basis for the rights of employees who are selected by competitive examination. 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (1982).
Like merit selection and competitive examination, restrictions on the political activities
of public employees always have been tied closely to concerns about patronage and the desire for an impartial and effective public service. As the federal bureaucracy increased its
involvement in private activities, fear of the abuse of the power by the federal bureaucracy
to advance partisan political causes led to the enactment of restrictions on the political
activities of federal employees. The Hatch Act, 53 Stat. 1147 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 & 18 U.S.C. (1982)), prohibited a federal employee from using his authority or influence to interfere with or affect an election and from taking any active part in
political management or in political campaigns. The penalty for violation of the Hatch Act
is job removal, 5 U.S.C. § 7325 (1982). While critics have faulted both the application of the
Act, see Rose, A Critical Look at the Hatch Act, 75 HARv. L. REV. 510 (1962), and its
guiding principle, see Esman, The Hatch Act: A Reappraisal,60 YALE L.J. 986 (1951), the
Act has withstood judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National
Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (Congress has authority to bar public employees from political campaigning and management); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75 (1947) (Congress has authority to restrict the political activities of federal employees). Attempts at legislative modification likewise have failed. See generally, Vaughn, Restrictions on the PoliticalActivities of Public Employees: The Hatch Act and Beyond, 44
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 516 (1976). The Civil Service Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat.
102 (1978) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7101 (1982)), embodies principles contained in the Hatch
Act and charges the administrative structure created by the Civil Service Reform Act with
enforcement of the Hatch Act. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1205(e)(1)(A) (1982) (investigative powers of
Special Counsel) 7325 (MSPB may apply lesser penalty than removal). A series of public
employment laws addressed the role of government as employer. Such provisions concerned
pay, fringe benefits (such as health care and retirement), job health and safety, and labor
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within open government and public employment laws. Because

both sets of enactments are complex, with diverse provisions and
policies contained within them, courts are confronted with a considerable challenge when asked to reconcile and integrate the different policies contained in these laws.
This Article examines the relationship between open government laws and public employment provisions, and suggests interpretations in both areas of the law which would foster judicial reconciliation of the policies contained within them. The Article also
explores the differing assumptions of these laws concerning the

control and use of information. While analysis of both state and
federal law is included, the central discussion focuses upon federal
provisions. The Article concludes that further reconciliation will
require legislative action, and that effective legislation must view
the two bodies of law as different approaches to similar problems.
This conclusion rests upon the common focus of these
laws-regulating and controlling public bureaucracies.
I.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPEN

GOVERNMENT LAWS AND PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS

PROVISIONS
Judicial decisions interpreting the relationship between open
government laws and public employment provisions generally focus upon four major areas in public employment: public sector labor relations, government investigations of applicants and employ-

ees, disciplinary and other personnel actions, and ethics and
relations. As with the Veterans Preference Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 387 (repealed 1966), some
public employee laws reflected passing societal concerns articulated at a particular time.
While the provisions may be consistent with the general goals of public employment legislation established in the Pendleton Act and the Civil Service Reform Act, they were motivated by more specific and particular concerns. Apart from the Veterans Preference Act of
1944, examples include the loyalty and security legislation of the 1950s and the equal employment provisions of the 1960s and 1970s.
Fears about the loyalty of federal employees in the 1950s led to administrative actions
increasing the scrutiny of the loyalty and suitability of federal employees and applicants for
federal positions. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 731.202(a)(7) (1982). Supplementing these administrative actions was legislation similarly designed. See 5 U.S.C. § 7532 (1982). A critical aspect
of this scrutiny involved investigations of applicants and employees and an evaluation of
their loyalty as well as the risks they might pose to the security of the government.
While public employment laws are less coherent than open government laws, the bulk of
public employment laws can be related to two or three basic principles which have remained
unaltered for nearly a hundred years.
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accountability. The open government provisions most often at issue are freedom of information laws, privacy acts and open meeting acts. In addition, judicial interpretation sometimes includes
discussion of public financial disclosure provisions. The interrelationship between open government laws and public employment
provisions is a complex problem, and attempts to reconcile the
many conflicts arising between the two bodies of law have been
difficult. Thus, while the courts' decisions often turn upon interpretation of the open government laws, these decisions may not be
scrutinized fully or evaluated without considering the relevant
public employment provisions.
A.

Public Sector Labor Relations

Judicial interpretation of open government laws affecting public sector labor relations principally focuses upon three areas: 1)
access to the bargaining process through sunshine provisions; 2)
acquisition by unions of information related to collective bargaining or to the union's duty of fair representation of individual employees; and 3) acquisition by third parties of information regarding union activities. Resolution of issues encompassed in these
areas requires a court to give initial consideration to the unique
character of public sector labor relations; for example, determining
access to collective bargaining materials involves an examination of
the bargaining process, union requests for information tests the
status of unions under open government laws, and third party requests suggest how much of a union's activity can be insulated
from public scrutiny. The importance of each determination is explored below.
1. Access to the bargainingprocess. One of the first issues
which state courts had to confront was the question of whether
meetings held in preparation for collective bargaining and collective bargaining sessions must be open to the public.10 The decision
10. Board of Selectmen v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 360, 388 N.E.2d
302 (1979); State ex. rel. Bd. of Pub. Util. v. Crow, 592 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979);
Burlington Community School Dist. v. Public Emp. Relations Bd., 268 N.W.2d 517 (Iowa
1978); Talbot v. Concord Union School Dist., 114 N.H. 532, 323 A.2d 912 (1974). Contra
Carroll County Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 294 Md. 144, 448 A.2d 345 (1982) (legislature
intended collective bargaining meetings be made public); Littleton Educ. Ass'n v. Arapahoe
County School Dist., 191 Colo. 411, 553 P.2d 793 (1976) (in absence of express statutory
authorization, closed school board meetings held to violate public meetings laws).
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of the Supreme Court of Florida in Bassett v. Braddock11 illustrates the rationale courts have employed when called upon to construe sunshine laws to exclude collective bargaining preparatory
meetings and collective bargaining sessions.
In Bassett, the Florida Supreme Court reasoned that open
meetings concerning the public employer's negotiations would disadvantage the public employer by advising the union of the employer's negotiating strategy.1 2 Moreover, the court determined
that publicity during the bargaining process could force the parties
into rigid positions.13 Yet despite the closed-door negotiations, the
court found that the philosophy of the open meeting provisions
was satisfied because an agreement reached in negotiation was tentative, and because the public would have an opportunity to com14
ment before the adoption or final ratification of the agreement.
Since Bassett, many commentators have discussed whether such
access would have the effect presumed by the courts 5 and whether
open bargaining primarily benefits labor or management. 6 For example, Professor Summers has argued that public knowledge of
negotiations is necessary because collective bargaining is an integral part of the political process. 17 For Summers, a lack of knowledge of the positions taken by the parties during bargaining handicaps the public's ability both to present views before an agreement
is reached and to hold public officials responsible for their actions.18 Summers has suggested, however, that the enhancement of
public knowledge need not involve open sessions, but rather some
11. 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972).
12. Id. at 426-28.
13. Id. at 428.

14. Id. at 427. Similar state provisions allowing closed meetings to discuss negotiation
strategies have been interpreted to permit closed meetings only during actual discussion of
labor negotiations, see Wexford County Prosecuting Att'y v. Pranger, 83 Mich. App. 197,
268 N.W.2d 344 (1978), or to permit status briefings on negotiations. See Jefferson City Bd.
of Educ. v. Courier-Journal, 551 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
15. See, e.g., Morris, Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Public Employee
Bargainingin Texas, 13 Hous. L. REv. 291 (1976). Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MicH. L. Rav. 885, 901-02 (1972).
16. Casey, What is the Effect of a "Sunshine Law" on Public Sector Collective Bargaining: A Management Perspective, 5 J.L. & EDuc. 481 (1976); Slesnick, What is the Effect of a "Sunshine Law" on Public Sector Collective Bargaining:A Union Perspective, 5
J.L. & EDUC. 487 (1976).

17. Summers, PublicEmployee Bargaining:A PoliticalPerspective, 83 YALe L.J. 1156,
1199 (1974).
18. Id. at 1197.
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procedure by which government officials report to the public regarding the course of negotiations. 9
Meetings where bargaining strategy is discussed also may be
closed to the public under federal statutory provisions. For example, the Government in the Sunshine Act permits an agency to
close a meeting in order to prevent the premature disclosure of information which would be likely to "significantly frustrate implementation of a proposed agency action."2 The conference report
which accompanied the Act on passage by the House and Senate
cites the discussion of an agency's strategy in collective bargaining
as an example of actions falling under this language. 2 The authors
of the conference report assumed that disclosure of management
strategy might make agreement difficult if not impossible.2 2 This
interpretation of the Government in the Sunshine Act, based on
the conference report, allows an agency to close strategy sessions
regarding collective bargaining.23
Unions have argued before the North Dakota Public Employment Relations Board, an administrative agency charged with interpreting and enforcing public sector collective bargaining agreements, that violations of open meeting provisions relating to
negotiations and to other agency actions should be deemed unfair
labor practices. 24 Courts have been reluctant to so interpret general
labor legislation.25 Indeed, the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978
clearly defines unfair labor practices in a manner which does not
require that a violation of an open government provision be held
an unfair labor practice.26
Because violations of open government laws do not constitute
unfair labor practices, the courts must formulate remedies under
19. Id. at 1198.
20. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(9)(B) (1982).
21. S. REP. No. 1178, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1976).
22. Id.
23. Bargaining sessions, as contrasted with strategy sessions, are unlikely to fall under
the Sunshine Act because the Act applies only to the meetings of the heads of multi-headed
agencies. While agency heads may plan negotiation strategies and approve negotiated agreements, it is unlikely that the heads of the agency would negotiate directly with union
representatives.
24. See, e.g., Dickinson Educ. As'n v. Dickinson Pub. School Dist. No. 1, 252 N.W.2d
205 (N.D. 1977).
25. Local 79, Serv. Employees Int'l Union v. Lapeer County Gen. Hosp., 111 Mich.
App. 441, 314 N.W.2d 648 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
26. See 5 U.S.C. § 7116 (1982).
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the open government laws themselves. When such violations are
considered, decisions should rest upon whether the court interprets
the open government provisions to provide reversal as a remedy. A

violation which is harmless should not be used to overturn an otherwise proper agency action.17 The Government in the Sunshine
Act does not provide for the remedy of reversal of an agency action

taken in violation of the Act,28 and the legislative history of the
Act indicates that such a remedy is not necessarily implied. Thus,
unions may not have grounds for redress for specific agency actions
under either the open government or the labor laws.
While open meeting provisions allow an agency to close a

meeting for certain reasons, the provisions do not mandate that
the agency do 80.29 Therefore, an agency could choose to hold an

open bargaining session, but if it does choose to exercise its discretion to hold an open bargaining session, its conduct may be viewed

as a refusal to bargain in good faith.30 The determination that such
an agency action, which is already allowed under open government
laws, is a refusal to bargain in good faith, rests upon the presumption that a negotiating process open to the public is inconsistent
with collective bargaining. Thus, the policies incorporated into the

public sector collective bargaining law limit the discretion allowed
by open government laws.

Courts confronting an open meeting law that does not specifi27. Dickinson Educ. Ass'n v. Dickinson Pub. School Dist. No. 1, 252 N.W. 2d 205 (N.D.
1977).
28. In an action brought under 5 U.S.C. § 552b(h)(2) (1982), challenging an agency's
holding of a closed meeting, the court cannot correct Sunshine Act violations; it cannot "set
aside, enjoin or invalidate any agency action (other than an action to close a meeting or to
withhold information under this section) taken or discussed at any agency meeting out of
which the violation of this section arose." Id. Section 552b(h)(2) does not create an independent right of action. Persons invoking 552b(h)(2) must satisfy traditional standing requirements. S. REP. No. 354, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1976). The legislative history suggests that
only in extreme circumstances is a court to set aside an agency action taken at a closed
meeting. Id.; S. REP. No. 1178, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1976). The factors suggested in
finding such extreme circumstances are: 1) if the violation is intentional; 2) if there are
repeated violations; 3) if the violation is prejudicial to the rights of any person participating
in review proceedings; and 4) if the public interest clearly supports revising the agency action. S. REP. No. 354, supra at 34.
. 29. Exemptions to open meeting provisions may be discretionary, giving the agency authority to close meetings, but not requiring it to do so. For example, under the Sunshine
Act, some agencies declined to apply exemptions available to them. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. §
1012 (1982).
30. See Talbot v. Concord Union School Dist., 114 N.H. 532, 533, 323 A.2d 912, 913-14
(1974).

1983]

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

475

cally exclude collective bargaining negotiations must decide
whether or not to create an exemption from access. Because of the
effect which publicizing such information may have on negotiations, a court's decision must consider not only the open meeting
laws but also the character of the bargaining process in the public
sector. Statutes or judicial decisions dictating access to collective
bargaining implicitly assume important differences between collective bargaining in the public and private sectors. These differences
may rest upon a perceived public interest vindicated by knowledge
of the negotiation process, but regardless of their source, courts
clearly cannot avoid evaluating the differences between public and
private sector labor relations. Union requests for information
therefore illustrate the manner by which the unique nature of public sector labor relations affects a public employee union's access to
information.
2. Union requests for information. Government records contain considerable information which would be useful to a labor organization. These records contain information helpful to union organizing; reports concerning negotiating strategy and budgetary
constraints valuable in establishing the union's negotiating position; and the contingencies planned by the employer should a
strike occur, an important consideration in the union's decision of
whether to strike or not. Individual union officials as well as unions
have requested information useful to the labor organizations, and
the courts have considered these requests for information under
open government laws in a variety of circumstances. This Section
discusses the response of the courts to these requests. It also explores the extent to which a union and a government employer
may negotiate regarding the release of information, and how both
open government provisions and public sector labor laws may restrict a union's access to such information.
B. Union Access to Information: Organization,Negotiation and
Strikes
In attempting to organize employees or to displace another
union as a bargaining representative, unions have sought the
names and addresses of public employees within the appropriate
governmental unit. 1 A union also has sought copies of grievance
31.

Clark v. Walton, 347 So. 2d 670 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Webb v. City of Shreve-
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decisions filed by employees represented by a rival union, 32 and the
names and addresses of employees signing a petition seeking an
election to challenge the union's status as exclusive
representative."3
Since most state freedom of information provisions provide access to any person or organization regardless of need, 34 state courts
in these instances have been called upon to consider whether any
special reasons exist for treating unions or union organizers differently from other organizations or persons.3 5 One source to which
the courts look to decide this issue is public sector labor relations
law. 6 Absent special reason for treating a union's request differently, employee privacy interests generally have been considered
insufficient to deny access to names and addresses.37 One state
court has stated, however, that employee privacy interests may be
sufficient not only to require that matter identifying individuals be
deleted from grievance decisions, but also to prohibit a public employee relations board from granting access to the names and addresses of employees seeking an election to challenge the union's
status.38 While the federal FOIA also grants access to any person
regardless of need, the use to which the requester will put the information becomes relevant when the request may invade the privacy interests of public employees.39 Cases interpreting the federal
port, 371 So. 2d 316 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 374 So. 2d 657 (La. 1979); Warden v.
Bennett, 340 So. 2d 977 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
32. United Fed. of Teachers v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 104 Misc. 2d 623,
428 N.Y.S.2d 823 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
33. Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Helsby, 84 Misc. 2d 17, 374 N.Y.S.2d 262 (Sup. Ct. 1975)
(information specifically exempt under open government statute).
34. See Braverman and Heppler, A PracticalReview of State Open Records Laws, 49
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 720, 727 (1981).
A public information law may not require that the agency provide the information in a
particular format. See, e.g., Seigle v. Barry, 422 So. 2d 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (agency
not required to use program developed by requester to provide computer data); see also
Yeager v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 1 Gov'T Disc. SERV. (P-H) 1 80,283 (D.D.C. 1980)
(agency not required to "compact" data to avoid application of the privacy exemption).
35. Generally, the fact that the requester is a union organizer does not present any
special reason for treating the request differently. Warden v. Bennett, 340 So. 2d 977 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
36. Id.
37. Clark v. Walton, 347 So. 2d 670 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Warden v. Bennett, 340
So. 2d 977 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
38. United Fed. of Teachers v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 104 Misc. 2d 623,
428 N.Y.S.2d 823 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
39. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1982). The "clearly unwarranted" language of (b)(6) indicates
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Act suggest, however, that access still would follow closely the pat40
tern of the state cases.
Unions have used FOIA provisions to acquire two types of information for negotiation: material useful in identifying and evaluating management's negotiating strategy, and material regarding
substantive issues likely to be the subject of negotiation. With the
first, public information law controls; with the second, labor relations law predominates. This distinction is significant because it
oftentimes will allow unions access they would not otherwise have
had. For example, budgetary documents, useful to a union in determining negotiating strategy, are not necessarily exempt from
disclosure. While state FOIA provisions may exempt documents
developed in preparation for a negotiation, 1 budgetary documents
developed in the normal course of business may be available even
though the documents provide information helpful to a union in
adopting a negotiation strategy.42 Although the Government in the
Sunshine Act allows an agency to close those portions of meetings
concerning proposed strategy in collective bargaining, 43 agencies
may not close meetings discussing the agency's budget proposals.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia emphasized in Common Cause v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission4 that disclosure of the budgetary process differed from disclosure of collective bargaining strategies because disclosure of the
latter would likely frustrate significantly the implementation of a
proposed agency action. The court reasoned that unlike bargaining
strategies, disclosure of an agency's budget discussions would not
that the interests of the requester and of the public must be balanced against the privacy

interests of the individual. See Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
40.

The exemption favors disclosure, Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Dept. of

Agric., 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974); the invasion of privacy by the release of names and
addresses is limited; and the union serves not a limited commercial interest but potentially
the interest of all employees who are members. See Disabled Officers Ass'n v. Brown, 1
Gov'T Disc. SERv. (P-H) 1 79,182 (D.D.C. 1979). Contra, American Fed. of Gov't Employees
v. United States, 3 Gov'T Disc. SERV. (P-H) 1 83,236 (4th Cir. 1983) (release of names and
addresses would benefit union in a proprietary sense rather than a public sense). See infra
discussion at notes 222-29.

41.

See supra at notes 10-14.

42. If documents are prepared in the normal course of business, they cannot have been
prepared "in preparation for negotiations." See City of Gainesville v. International Ass'n of
Fire Fighters, Local 2157, 298 So. 2d 478, 479-80 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
43. See supra notes 20-23.
44. 674 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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affect the decisions of private parties concerning those parties'
dealings with the government. 4 5 Since federal general service employees may not negotiate regarding salary, 46 the behavior of unions toward the government is probably not affected by budget information. To the extent this assumption is true, the court's
distinction between information relating to collective bargaining
strategies and to the budgetary process is sound. In some instances, however, even documents that directly relate to an
agency's negotiating strategy may be available to a union. Under
New York's freedom of information law,47 a union gained access to
a report prepared by a state agency that compiled salary data and
information regarding fringe benefits of teachers and administrators of specific school districts. 48 The report was used by the school
districts in negotiating salaries with the union. No exemption contained in the state freedom of information law applied to the report, and the agency therefore was ordered to provide the report to
the union as it would to any other requester.
In similar circumstances, a federal court has held that a union
does not enjoy rights greater than that of a member of the public
requesting the information, and on that basis upheld an agency's
denial of a request for information. In National Treasury Employees Union v. U.S. Department of the Treasury,49 a union requested a handbook to be used by agency officials in collective bargaining. Portions of the handbook contained the history of each
article in the contract and the agency's interpretation of the particular article. The court concluded that since these provisions did
not affect a member of the public, they related solely to the internal personnel practices of the agency. 0 The court rejected the
45. Id. at 933.
46. Federal employees may negotiate "conditions of employment" except where such
matters are specifically provided for by federal statute. See 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(12), (14)
(1982). Federal employees salaries are determined by an extensive statutory scheme. See 5
U.S.C. chs. 51-59 (1982).
47. N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 87 (McKinney Supp. 1982).
48. Doolan v. Board of Coop. Educ. Serv., 48 N.Y.2d 341, 398 N.E.2d 533, 422 N.Y.S.2d
927 (1979).
49. 487 F. Supp. 1321 (D.D.C. 1980).
50. Id. at 1323. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1982). The (b)(2) exemption allows withholding of documents or records that are "related solely to the internal personnel rules and
practices of an agency." In Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976), the
Supreme Court adopted a narrow interpretation of this exemption. The Court found that
"exemption 2 is not applicable to matters subject to such a genuine and significant public

1983]

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

479

union's argument that as federal employees its members were indeed "members of the public" affected by the handbook.51 Rather,
the court held that the concept "members of the public" distinguished the public at large from federal employees. 52
Union access to information useful in bargaining also may be
obtained under labor relations provisions. For example, the Civil
Service Reform Act imposes upon an agency the obligation to provide information maintained in the regular course of business and
which is otherwise available for proper discussion of subjects
within the scope of collective bargaining." This provision arguably
provides unions with access to information not necessarily available to a member of the public under FOIA." The Civil Service Reform Act does, however, permit an agency to withhold documents
that guide, advise, or train management officials regarding collective bargaining.5 5 This exemption from disclosure under the Civil
Service Reform Act would also permit withholding under FOIA, 5
because FOIA exempts from disclosure documents specifically exempted under qualifying federal statutes. 7
interest." Id. at 369.
An opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia articulates the factors used to evaluate an agency's assertion that an agency manual or guide is
protected from release by the (b)(2) exemption. The court identified the crucial factors to
be: 1) is the manual predominantly used for internal purposes; 2) is it designed to establish
rules and practices for agency personnel such as law enforcement techniques; and 3) would
public disclosure risk circumvention of agency regulations. Croaker v. Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Administrative manuals relating to
grievance, equal opportunity employment complaints, discipline, transfers for disciplinary
reasons, and ethical matters are matters of public interest and are available to employee
organizations as they would be to any member of the public. FBI Agents Ass'n v. FBI, 3
Gov'T. Disc. SERv. (P-H) 83,058 (D.D.C. 1983).
51. National Treas. Employees Union v. United States Dep't of the Treas., 487 F. Supp.
1321 (D.D.C. 1980).
52. Id. at 1322-23.
53. 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b)(4) (1982).
54. Within the scope of 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b)(4) (1982) is likely to fall information exempt
under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1982). But see American Fed. of Gov't Employees v. United
States, 3 Gov'T Disc. SERv. (P-H) 83,236 (4th Cir. 1983) (court refused to order disclosure
of names and addresses to union which alleged that government agency restricted worktime
union organizing).
55. 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b)(4)(C) (1982).
56. See National Treas. Employees Union v. United States Customs Serv., 2 Gov'T
Disc. SERv. (P-H) %82,1919 (D.D.C. 1982).
57. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1982). To qualify under the exemption a statute must require
that information be withheld or "establish particular criteria for withholding or refers to
particular types of matters to be withheld." The language was designed to include within
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Finally, striking unions sometimes seek the names and addresses of substitute employees hired by the public employer in
anticipation of a strike. Unless a court is willing to assume that
the union will seek to intimidate these substitute employees, the
potential misuse of the information by the union should not preclude access when other requesters would be entitled to the information.59 Arguably, a similar result attends even if the requester's
use is relevant to weighing the interests in disclosure and privacy1 0
C. Negotiating to Disclose Information
The frequent inclusion of provisions which dictate agency information practices within collective bargaining agreements illustrates that public sector collective bargaining affects various statutory provisions. Likewise, open government laws may affect
contractual obligations incorporated into a collective bargaining
agreement by, for example, an FOIA provision compelling a public
employer to disregard a portion of a collective bargaining agreement. In Mills v. Doyle,61 a Florida appeals court ordered the release of documents concerning a grievance filed by a schoolteacher
against the school system. The public employer had refused to provide a grievance fie to the requester because the agreement between the employer and the bargaining agent for the employees
the FOIA exemptions documents protected from release by other federal statutes. See generally FEDERAL INFORMATION DIsCoSURE, supra note 2, at ch. 13.
58. For example, union representatives for teachers might seek the names and addresses of substitute teachers because substitutes would provide an alternative supply of
labor in the event of a strike; their interests are often at odds with full time teachers, and
they may be represented by their own organization.
59. See Morrison v. School Dist. 48, 53 Or. App. 148, 631 P.2d 784 (1981); Lane County
School Dist. No. 4 v. Parks, 55 Or. App. 416, 637 P.2d 1383 (1981). In Morrison, the court
specifically refused to use the collective bargaining statutes to create an exemption to release the names and addresses under the public information laws. It should be noted, however, that some state statutes give access automatically to the names and addressses of public employees. See infra note 243 and statutes listed therein.
60. If the request is made by a union representing striking employees (see, e.g.,
Timberlane Reg. Educ. Ass'n v. Crompton, 114 N.H. 315, 319 A.2d 632 (1974)), access might
be denied if the applicable labor relations law prohibited the strike. In these circumstances,
granting access to the information would advance the union's efforts toward achieving an
illegal purpose and the public interest would weigh against disclosure. A union, however,
need only request the lists prior to the commencement of a strike. In those circumstances, a
court would find it much more difficult to identify a public interest which would tip the
balance against disclosure.
61. 407 So. 2d 348 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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required that grievance documents remain confidential. The court
held that the grievance documents were available under the public
records law, and concluded that to allow a private contract to exempt public records from disclosure would destroy the public
2
6
records law.

In contrast, the decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Local 2047 v. Defense General Supply Agency 3 illustrates
that an open government provision may allow an agency to withhold from a public employee union information that was previously provided under a collective bargaining agreement. In that
case, the agency agreed to provide the union with access to certain
information concerning employees of the agency; this information
was relevant to the union's representation of employees within the
bargaining unit. However, the agreement also specifically provided,
as was then required by Executive Order 11491," that the terms of
the agreement were governed by existing and future law. Subsequently, Congress enacted the Privacy Act which prohibited the
release of the information the union was to receive under the
agreement.6 5 Since the Privacy Act prohibited release, the collective bargaining agreement incorporated the prohibition under Executive Order 11491. By implication, even if the collective bargaining agreement did not incorporate future law, the public employer
would be bound by the statutory provision.6
The union argued that the Privacy Act empowered the agency
to promulgate regulations exempting release of the information to
the union from the prohibitions of the Act.67 Since the agency had
the power to disclose, the union contended that the agency should
not be allowed to issue regulations which foreclosed access to information provided for under the collective bargaining agreement.
62. Id. at 350.
63. 573 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1978).
64. Id. at 186, quoting Exec. Order 11491, 34 Fed. Reg. 17,605 (1969).
65. Unless certain exceptions apply, the Privacy Act prohibits the release of information regarding an individual contained in an agency system of records and retrievable by
some personally identifiable symbol without the written consent of the individual. 5 U.S.C. §
552a(b) (1982).
66. Collective bargaining agreements in the federal government are subject to law, rule,
and regulation. 5 U.S.C. § 7117 (1982). See infra notes 73-76. The impact of changes in law
or regulation may be a more difficult question in states where the scope of collective bargaining is less-clearly limited.
67. Local 2047, American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Defense Gen. Supply Center, 573
F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1978).

482

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

The court rejected this argument, reasoning that the agency's
rulemaking authority could not be limited by an agreement entered into in advance of the legislation."8 Relying upon the presumption of the validity of administrative regulations and the existence of justifiable grounds for narrowing access to certain
information, 9 the trial court denied the union relief10 and the
Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Public information laws properly limit the provisions in collective bargaining agreements which violate those laws. When, however, an agency enjoys discretion in its information practices under
open government laws' 1 collective bargaining agreements can limit
the exercise of that discretion. Still, an agency will not necessarily
be under an obligation to bargain with the union regarding such
practices nor to meet and confer with it.7 2 The agency's authority

or duty to negotiate its information practices with a public employee union turns upon the interpretation of the applicable statutes regulating public sector labor relations. For example, the labor
management relations sections of the Civil Service Reform Act impose, with certain exceptions, a duty to negotiate rules affecting
working conditions.73 One of these exceptions is that negotiation is
not permitted when the personnel rule is specifically provided by
federal statute or government-wide rule or regulation. 4 The legislative history of the Civil Service Reform Act emphasizes that bargaining within this scope is required except where inconsistent
with law, rule, or regulation. 75 Therefore, in circumstances where
an open government law allows agency discretion, federal unions
68. Id. at 186.
69. The court found the requested information to be of a personal nature, and concluded that refusal to provide the information to the union was dictated by congressional
concern about the release of personal information collected by agencies to third parties. See
Local 2047, American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Defense Gen. Supply Center, 423 F.
Supp. 481, 485 n.8 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd, 573 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1978).
70. 423 F. Supp. at 486.
71. For example, most of the exceptions to the federal FOIA are discretionary and do
not create any mandatory duty to withhold. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281
(1979).
72. Berkeley Police Ass'n v. City of Berkeley, 76 Cal. App. 3d 931, 143 Cal. Rptr. 255
(1977).
73. 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(12) (1982).
74. Id. § 7117.
75. H. CONF. REP. No. 1717, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 155 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. N.ws 2860, 2889.
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may seek to bargain regarding an agency's information practices. 7
Cases concerning requests for information by federal employee
unions illustrate how limitations on the scope of collective bargaining can restrict substantially the rights of a union to information
through the collective bargaining process. Under the Civil Service
Reform Act, agencies are not required to negotiate personnel rules
specifically established by federal statute or regulation. 7 In the
federal government, statutes set wages,78 retirement,7 9 classification, 0 performance evaluations,8 1 and fringe benefits.2 Therefore
these subjects are not mandatory topics for bargaining." Given
these limitations on bargaining, unions may not require the employer to provide the information as part of the bargaining process,
but must seek the information under the federal Freedom of Information Act.
Federal employee unions have sought a wide assortment of
material under the FOIA, such as information concerning new classification standards,8 4 documents outlining Senior Executive Performance Objectives and Expectations,8 5 position papers outlining
potential staff cuts,' and rate proposals of carriers participating in
the federal employee health benefits program.8 7 In each of these
cases, 8 the courts evaluated the union's request for information as
if the request for the information had been by a member of the
76.

Very few, if any, collective bargaining agreements, however, include union negoti-

ated rights under the Privacy Act such as provisions granting union access to additional
information. J. O'RL=Y, UNIONS' RIGHTS TO COMP'Y INFORMATION 89-90 [herinafter UNIONS'

RIGHTS TO COMPANY INFORMATION].

77.
78.
79.
80.

5 U.S.C. § 7117 (1982).
Id. §§ 5301-5311, 5501-5596.
Id.
Id. §§ 5101-5115.
81. Id. §§ 4301-4304.
82. Id.
insurance).

§§

6301-6326 (leave of service), 8701-8716 (life insurance), 8901-8913 (health

83. Id. § 7106(a).
84. National Treas. Employees Union v. United States, 2 Gov'T Disc. SERV. (P-H)
81,146 (D.D.C. 1981).
85. Ferris v. IRS, 2 Gov'T Disc. SEnv. (P-H) 1 82,084 (D.D.C. 1981).
86. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Department of Educ., 3 Gov'T Disc. SERv.
(P-H) 1 82,491 (D.D.C. 1982).
87. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Campbell, 1 Gov'T DISc. SmV. (P-H) 80,129
(D.D.C. 1980).
88. Even though a union might not directly bargain regarding these issues, information
concerning them could be valuable to the union in representing and advising individual
employees and in informing and counseling its membership.
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general public. On this basis, the courts denied the union's access
to at least part of the information sought. Thus, it may be concluded that while FOIA provides an alternative means by which
unions may gain access to information regarding matters which are
not the subject of bargaining,"' the Act fails to provide a government union with a suitable substitute for the rights enjoyed by unions in the private sector.90
D.

Requests Regarding Union Activity

In many instances, public employers legitimately may collect
information regarding activities of public employee unions. For example, the Civil Service Reform Act allows union officers to use
official time to pursue certain union activities relating to collective
bargaining and other union responsibilities. 1 In order to implement this provision, a federal agency may need to maintain records
regarding the on-duty activities of union officers.92
Although the acquisition of information regarding union activities by the government is permissible, a problem arises because
much of this information appears to be available to the public
under open government provisions, regardless of a requester's motive. Freedom of information provisions provide little special protection for information describing union activities, and as a result
89. Under the FOIA, a prevailing party in certain circumstances may recover attorneys'
fees. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982). Although a union may be entitled to attorneys' fees, it
may find that the amount recoverable is limited to less than the market value of services
provided. See National Treas. Employees Union v. United States Dep't of the Tress., 656 F.
2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
90. In the private sector, the National Labor Relations Act has been interpreted to
require the employer to provide information "particularly within the knowledge of either
party [that] is of the essence of the bargaining process." S.L. Allen Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 714, 728
(1936). Considerable information is presumed relevant to the bargaining process, including
wage data of all types, bonus programs, insurance, pension and health plans, job classification, training data, and equal employment data. UNIONS' RIGHTS TO COMPANY INFORMATION,
supra note 76, at 23-36.
The Civil Service Reform Act requires, unless prohibited by law, that the agency furnish
to a union which is an exclusive representative of a bargaining unit data maintained in the
normal course of business proper for discussion within the scope of bargaining. 5 U.S.C. §
7114(b)(4) (1982). See supra notes 53-57.
91. 5 U.S.C. § 7131(a), (c), (d) (1982). Activities related to internal business affairs,

such as solicitation of membership or collection of dues, shall not be conducted on official
time. Id. § 7131(b).
92. Such information gathering authority, of course, cannot be used to intimidate union
officials. See 5 U.S.C: § 7116 (1982).
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third parties enjoy considerable access to these types of documents. For example, in American Federationof Government Employees v. Veterans Administration," upon request by the Public
Service Research Foundation, the Veterans Administration released documents disclosing the names of certain union officers
and the amount of official time that each had spent on union activities. The federal district court rejected an attempt by the public
employee union to restrict future access to such records, finding
that union officials had no privacy interest that would be affected
by release of the information. According to the court, documents
concerning the amount of official time spent on union related activities were no different in nature from reports on the amount of
time an employee spent performing normal duties. 4 Because the
union officers had no privacy interest that would be affected by
release, the court deemed the identity or purpose of the requester
as irrelevant.9 5 The reasoning of the case suggests that freedom of
information provisions may make documents regarding unions and
their activities available to the public.
E. Reconciliation of Policies Regarding Public Sector Labor
Relations
The difficulties confronted in applying open government provisions to public sector collective bargaining arise in part from the
distinctions drawn by public employment provisions between public and private sector labor relations. For example, because of the
prohibition against strikes in public sector labor law, courts must
consider whether the prohibition provides a basis for denying a
union information under a freedom of information law.96 Moreover,
because the scope of bargaining is often more narrow in the public
than the private sector, unions often find they must use open government provisions to acquire information readily available during
93.

2 Gov'T Disc. SERV. (P-H) 1 81,159 (D.D.C. 1981).

94.
95.

Id. at 81,424.
Id.

96.

See supra note 29. For a description of state public employee strike prohibitions,
TANIMOTO & J. NAJrrA, GUIDE TO STATUTORY PROVISIONS IN PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIvE BARGAINING: STRIKE RIGHTS AND PROHIBITIONS (1974). Provisions contained in 5 U.S.C.
§ 7311 (1982) prohibit strikes by federal employees, and 18 U.S.C. § 1918 (1976) provides
criminal penalities for violations.
see

H.
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the collective bargaining process in the private sector.9 7 The restricted scope of bargaining also may influence interpretation of
open government provisions,9 8 and the ability of a union to negotiate regarding access to information. 99
More importantly, the difficulties encountered in applying
open government provisions to public sector collective bargaining
highlight the significant differences between public sector labor relations and labor relations in the private sector. Public sector labor
relations take place within a political process to which open government laws provide public access. The issue of public access to
the negotiation process, the union's use of freedom of information
provisions, the impact of open government laws upon provisions of
a labor contract, and third party requests for information regarding union activity demonstrate that labor relation litigation in the
public sector likely will include important questions regarding
public scrutiny that need not be addressed in private sector labor
relations. Because of open government laws, courts should not ignore the differences between collective bargaining in the public
and private sectors.
In examining the difficulties encountered in reconciling public
sector labor relations with open government provisions, specific
values that resist application of the private sector model to public
sector labor relations should be favored over general arguments
about the character of collective bargaining in the public sector.
Principal among these specific values is the need for the public to
understand and to evaluate governmental actions including those
involving collective bargaining.
II.

A.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS AND EMPLOYEE RIGHTS

Investigations of Applicants and Employees

Federal agencies conduct a number of different types of investigations of federal employees and applicants for federal employment. Agencies investigate applicants for job qualifications, 10 0 suit97.

See supra notes 53-57 and notes 77-90.

98.

See supra notes 34-51.

99. See supra notes 61-76.
100. Agencies enjoy considerable discretion in the determination of the scope of an in-
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ability, 101 and security. 10 2 Agencies scrutinize employees for
promotion,0 3 for discipline (including possible criminal prosecution),101 and for other personnel actions including transfers and
reassignments.1 0 5 These investigations may be conducted by the
agency itself, by another agency, by the Office of Personnel Management, by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or by another
special investigatory agency. These federal investigations are similar to investigations conducted by state governments.1 06 Access to
these investigative reports by the applicants and employees depends upon the character of state freedom of information and state
privacy provisions.
Federal employees are protected by the Federal Privacy Act.
Senator Sam Ervin, the sponsor of the Senate Privacy Act bill and
its staunchest supporter, long had opposed the occurence of overly
broad investigations and the use of improper investigatory techniques by federal agencies which threatened the privacy interests
of federal employees.107 The Privacy Act addresses many of these
concerns and provides protection by controlling the acquisition of
information, 08 by restricting the content of government records' 09
and the use of these records,"10 and by permitting the individual
who was the subject of records covered by the Act to inspect"' the
vestigation into an applicant's qualifications.
101. See 5 C.F.R. pt. 731 (1982).
102. 5 U.S.C. § 7532 (1982)(agency head may suspend or remove, without pay, an employee suspected of being a threat to national security); see also 5 C.F.R. § 731.202 (7)
(1982) (employee may be removed where there is reasonable doubt as to his loyalty to the
U.S. government).
103. 5 C.F.R. pt. 430 (perfomance appraisals), pt. 335 (promotions) (1983).
104. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7543 (1982).
105. 5 C.F.R. §§ 317.201-.703 (1982).
106. See, e.g., Nero v. Hyland, 76 N.J. 213, 386 A.2d 846 (1978).
107. For many years, Senator Ervin chaired the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
of the Senate Judiciary Committee. During his tenure as chairman, the subcommittee vigorously investigated violations of the privacy of federal employees. Senator Ervin introduced
legislation in 1976 to protect the rights and privacy of federal employees. See S. REP. No.
873, 91st Cong., 2d. Seass. 4 (1970).
108. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1)-(3) (1982).
109. See, e.g., id. § 552a(e)(5)(records must be accurate, timely, and complete), (7)(no
record may be kept of first amendment speech), (9)(record-keeping practices addressed and

regulated).
110. Id. § 552a(b), (c), (e)(10).
111. Id. § 552a(d)(1), (g)(1)(B). In the Privacy Act, Congress sought to protect individuals from the improper collection and misuse of personal data concerning them. Therefore,
some portions of an individual's records relating to a third party may be available to the
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records and request their amendment. 112

Because the Privacy Act explicitly concerns federal employees,
Congress, in passing the Act, considered its impact on federal personnel practices. For example, of the seven specific exemptions to
the Act, 1 " three directly concern federal personnel policy, 1 14 the
most significant being the exemption for "investigatory material
compiled solely for the purposes of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment, military service, Federal contracts, or access to classified information." 11 5 This
exemption, however, protects only a confidential source providing
information under an express promise of confidentiality.,, As to
information obtained prior to the passage of the Privacy Act, the
exemption protects the identity of the sources who were given an
117
implied promise of confidentiality.

In some circumstances, the FOIA as well as the federal Privacy Act applies to investigatory records sought by an applicant
for a federal job or by a federal employee. If the FOIA gives an
individual access to his records superior to that provided by the
Privacy Act, the individual may rely upon the FOIA to provide
such access. 1 8 However, the circuit courts have differed as to
individual. Congress did not intend to limit access on the grounds that information does not
pertain to the requester. Voelker v. IRS, 646 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1981).
112. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(3), (4), (g)(1)(A) (1982).
113. Id § 552a(k). In addition to the specific exemptions, two general exemptions apply
to the records of the Central Intelligence Agency and to the records of any agency or part of
any agency whose principal function is criminal law enforcement, including crime control,
apprehension, prosecution, correction, probation, and pardon and parole. The latter records
are exempted only if they contain: 1) information compiled for the purpose of identifying
criminal offenders; 2) information compiled for the purpose of criminal investigation; or 3)
reports compiled at any stage of criminal law enforcement-from arrest and indictment
through release and supervision. Id. § 552a(j).
114. Id. § 552a(k)(5), (6), (7). The three exemptions concern: 1) testing and examination material used solely to determine individual qualifications for appointment the release
of which would affect the testing process. States have similar protection for examination
material, see, e.g., Social Serv. Employees Union, Local 371 v. Cunningham, 109 Misc. 2d
331, 437 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Marvel v. Dalrymple, 38 Pa. Commw. 67, 393 A.2d
494 (1978); 2) evaluation materials for promotion in the armed services; and 3) certain investigatory materials.
115. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(5) (1982).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Several reasons exist why access might be available under the Freedom of Information Act but not under the Privacy Act. First, the Privacy Act applies only to agency
systems of records while the FOIA contains no such restriction. Second, the Privacy Act
requires that the record be retrievable by name or personal identifying symbol, while the
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whether the Privacy Act restricts an individual's access to his own
records under FOIA.119 Therefore, depending upon the circuit, applicants and employees may seek access to their records concerning
themselves under either FOIA or the federal Privacy Act.
Requests for access to and amendment of investigatory
records have come from unsuccessful applicants for federal jobs, 120
as well as from employees who are denied promotion,1 21 who are
investigated for misconduct, 122 or who are disciplined following an
investigation.123 While these requests arise in different settings and
are made under both the FOIA and the Privacy Act, they have
raised similar issues. These issues stem principally from the application of the exemptions of the FOIA and the Privacy Act.
FOIA requires only that a specific document be identified with reasonable particularity.
Third, the exemptions, both general and specific, differ froza the exemptions to the FOIA.
Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1982) with id. § 552a(j)-(k). Therefore, an exemption
might bar access under the Privacy Act while no exemption would apply to the record under
FOIA. Of course, FOIA only grants access and does not give by itself any right to seek
amendment of records. Any right to amend would arise from the Privacy Act. Because the
Privacy Act allows an individual access to his or her own record, access under the Privacy
Act is often more likely than access under FOIA. While fees may be charged under the
FOIA, fees are not charged under the Privacy Act.
119. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have held that an individual who is barred by a
Privacy Act exemption from obtaining his record may not obtain the record under FOIA.
Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1980); Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has held that the legislative history of the Privacy Act clearly shows that the
Privacy Act was not intended to be used in this way to limit the FOIA. Greentree v. United
States Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1982); accord Porter v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 717 F.2d 787(3d Cir. 1983). It should be noted that because the venue for any FOIA
case may be laid in the District of Columbia, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982), that circuit is
particularly influential in interpreting the FOIA.
120. Londrigan v. FBI, 670 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1981); White v. United States Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 589 F.2d 713 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979); Lorenz v.
United States Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 516 F. Supp. 1151 (D. Colo. 1981); Jane Doe v. United
States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 483 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Mervin v. Bonfanti, 410 F.
Supp. 1205 (D.D.C. 1976).
121. Blevins v. Plummer, 613 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1980) (military promotion); Devine v.
Marsh, 2 Gov'T Disc. SERv. (P-H) 82,022 (E.D. Va. 1981).
122. Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1981) (security investigation), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982); Von Tempske v. United States Dep't of Health &
Human Serv., 2 Gov' Disc. SRv. (P-H) 1 82,091 (W.D. Mo. 1981); Johnson v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 2 Gov'T Disc. SERv. (P-H) 82,041 (D. Or. 1981) (FBI investigation); Barnard v. IRS, 2 Gov'T Disc. SERv. (P-H) 81,214 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Perry v. FBI, 2
Gov'T Disc. SERV. (P-H) 81,342 (D. IM. 1980) (investigation of former employee).
123. Hernandez v. Alexander, 671 F.2d 402 (10th Cir. 1982); Smiertka v. United States
Dep't of Treas., 604 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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1. Nature of investigations. Agency investigations of applicants rely heavily upon information provided by third parties.1 24
Under the exemption to the Privacy Act, the identity of sources is
protected if the person supplying the information was given an express promise of confidentiality. 125 In limited circumstances, the
content of a report may be protected even if the identity of the
confidential source is known. 126 If, prior to the effective date of the
Privacy Act, an individual provided the information under an implied promise of confidentiality, 2 7 the identity of the person providing such information is protected. Determining whether the circumstances implied a promise of confidentiality can be difficult
and the burden rests with the agency to establish an implied promise.1 28 In carrying its burden of persuasion, the agency may not rely
upon broad, general conclusions unrelated to the circumstances of
the specific investigation.1 2
Agency investigations of employees also involve information
provided by third parties including that provided by other federal
employees. 130 While the exemption for suitability investigations
clearly applies to investigations of applicants for federal positions,
the application of the exemption to investigations of federal employees is less clear. The Tenth Circuit has concluded that suitability for federal employment requires a determination by the
agency not only when an applicant is hired but also throughout an
employee's service, and that the exemption applies to investigations of federal employees as well as applicants. 3 1 The court refused to treat suitability as a term of art applying to a limited category of conduct. Rather, the court treated it as a general term
encompassing misconduct occuring at any time during the tenure
124. See, e.g., Lorenz v. United States Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 516 F. Supp. 1151 (D.
Colo. 1981) (confidentiality of NRC's employment investigation source protected).
125. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(5) (1982). The exemption protects the identity of confidential
sources in cases seeking amendment of, or access to, records. Jane Doe v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 483 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
126. According to the Tenth Circuit, the substance of confidential information is connected to the source and must be protected to serve the purposes of the exemption. Volz v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 619 F.2d 49 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1980).
127. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(5) (1982).
128. Londrigan v. FBI, 670 F.2d 1164, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
129. Id. at 1170.
130. See infra notes 131-33.
131. Hernandez v. Alexander, 671 F.2d 402 (10th Cir. 1982).
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of a federal employee.1" 2
An investigation of a federal employee is more likely to concern the law enforcement duties of a federal agency than is the
investigation of an applicant. Thus, agency inspectors general and
internal investigative units, as well as criminal law enforcement officers, are more likely to be involved regarding the performance of
public duties by federal employees.""' If the investigation is for law
enforcement purposes, the law enforcement exemption to the
FOIA may become available to the agency. 3
Investigations of employees also are likely to involve circumstances where the agency reasonably can anticipate litigation. Personnel actions against the employee following an investigation predictably may lead to litigation either by the employee or by the
agency. The Privacy Act exempts from access "information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action or proceeding." 5
While the exemption applies to civil actions in court, its application to administrative proceedings that are judicial in form is less
clear.1 36 To the extent that it applies, the exemption is broader
than the attorney work product privilege and includes all docuprepared in anticipation of a civil action or
ments or materials
13 7
proceeding.
132. Id. at 406.
133. Criminal law enforcement records fall under one of the general exemptions of the
Privacy Act; administrative investigations do not. See supra note 113. Therefore, characterization of the investigation of an employee as criminal or administrative becomes important.
Von Tempske v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 2 Gov'T Disc. SERV. (P-H)
82,091 (W.D. Mo. 1981).
134. The law enforcement exemption of FOIA applies to administrative as well as criminal matters. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1982). In criminal law enforcement investigations, however, the agency may withhold the identity of the confidential source and confidential information obtained only from a confidential source. Two exemptions exist: one protecting the
identity of the confidential source and a separate exemption protecting confidential information obtained only from a confidential source. Duffin v. Carlson, 636 F.2d 709 (D.C. Cir.
1980). In other investigations involving civil or administrative enforcement authority, the
agency may withhold records that disclose the identity of the confidential source. Regardless
of the dates of the investigation, for a source to be confidential an agency must have given
an express or implied assurance of confidentiality. Pope v. United States, 599 F.2d 1383 (5th
Cir. 1979) (implied assurances found); Maroscia v. Levi, 569 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1977). A
confidential source may include other law enforcement organizations, including the agencies
of foreign governments. Lesar v. United States Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Church of Scientology v. United States Dep't of Justice, 612 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1979).
135. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(5) (1982) (exempting the concerned party from access).
136. See infra notes 83-87.
137. Hernandez v. Alexander, 671 F.2d 402 (10th Cir. 1982).
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2. Acquisition, disclosure, and amendment. Investigations of
applicants and employees are likely to involve issues regarding the
acquisition of information, the disclosure of information, and the
amendment of agency records. The Privacy Act requires that, "to
the greatest extent practicable," an agency should acquire information concerning applicants and employees directly from the subject
of its inquiry.131 With applicants, the agency usually seeks a great
deal of information from the job seeker before proceeding to other
sources. 131 Where the agency suspects wrongdoing on the part of
an employee, the agency may be required to first seek information
directly from the employee before contacting other sources. 40
Investigations of employees as well as investigations of applicants may include information acquired from other sources within
an agency and from other agencies. While the Privacy Act prohibits the release by an agency of an individual's record without the
individual's consent,14 1 it allows an agency to exempt from the consent requirement disclosure within the agency of information to officials who have a need for the record in performance of their duties. 42 In addition, any record may be disclosed within the agency
or outside of it for purposes compatible with the original purposes
for which the record was compiled. 143 These "routine uses," where
disclosure is allowed without consent,14 4 must be published annually in the Federal Register. 4' However, routine use is an ambiguous concept, and the question of whether or not disclosure of
agency records to an investigator from another agency constitutes
a routine use therefore depends upon the meaning given to the
138. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(2) (1982).
139.

The application process for federal employment requires completion of an exten-

sive form, SF-171, that provides significant information about the applicant's background,
education, employment, and experience.
140. Johnson v. IRS, 2 Gov'T Disc. SERV. (P-H) 81,370 (W.D. Tex. 1981). The court in
Johnson does not discuss whether there is a likelihood that notice provided by the requirement would interfere with the investigation. Such discussion would be relevant because the
Act requires the information be obtained directly from the subject "to the greatest extent
practicable."
141. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1982).
142. Id. § 552a(b)(1). For example, a superior may require knowledge of the background of an employee handling money or checks. Brooks v. Grinstead, 3 Gov'T Disc. SERV.
(P-H) 83,054 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
143. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7), (b)(3) (1982).
144.

Id.

145. Id. § 552a(e)(4)(D).
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term and upon the circumstances in which it is applied.
Investigations of employees appropriately involve a number of
the employees' personnel records to which agency officials must
have access in the course of the investigation. For example, an investigation by management officials of an employee for violation of
personnel provisions may draw upon agency personnel files and
equal opportunity employment records without requiring the consent of the employee to the disclosure of the files and records.14
However, a broad interpretation of the scope of the routine use
exception and the power of agency officials in personnel matters
would allow examination of almost every agency record regarding
an employee without first obtaining the employee's consent.
Examination of the records of other agencies during an investigation of an employee would raise additional considerations.
Principal among these would be the purpose for which the other
agency collected the information. The routine use exemption
would be more difficult to invoke regarding an interagency transfer
of records because of the possibility that the agency holding the
record had not promulgated the necessary routine use regulation.
Investigation of an applicant will be more likely to involve the
records of other agencies and is less likely to violate the Privacy
Act. There are two reasons for this phenomenon. First, to the extent that the records of another agency concern an applicant's previous employment with that agency, an applicant is likely to have
consented to the release of records as part of the application for
subsequent employment. 14 7 Second, suitability and security investigations utilize interagency exchange of the same types of records
in case after case. Since these exchanges involve records collected
for a similar purpose-to determine security risk and suitability-the routine use standard is satisfied,148 and the agencies involved are likely to have promulgated the necessary routine use
149
regulations.

Although the Privacy Act would allow employees and appli146. Hernandez v. Alexander, 671 F.2d 402 (10th Cir. 1982).
147. Perry v. FBI, 2 Gov'T Disc. SERv. (P-H) 1 81,342 (D. Ill. 1980), illustrates that
most application processes involve consent to the release of the records of other agencies.
148. Arguably, fies which contain only general information about the lawful activities
of citizens would violate the Privacy Act's prohibition against the collection of such information. Consequently, their use in security or suitability determinations is improper. 5 U.S.C. §
552a(e)(7) (1982). For a related discussion, see infra notes 54-55.
149. See 5 C.F.R. § 294.703(b) (1982).
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cants to seek amendment of records that the employee or applicant
believes to be inaccurate, 5 0 there is some case law which limits the
right to amend to factual matters and excludes opinions and conclusions from amendment. 15 1 Courts draw this distinction because
they believe opinions and conclusions are not subject to verification, and they therefore decline to determine the propriety
of an
15 2
opinion.
or
conclusion
a
amend
to
not
decision
agency
3. Reconciliation of the Privacy Act with agency investigations. The provisions of the Privacy Act can be reconciled with
agency investigations of applicants and employees. Reconciliation
is easiest where the investigations concern applicants or the offduty conduct of employees. In these situations, the investigations
provide the bases for predicting the behavior of the applicant as a
federal employee or the behavior of the employee on the job. Like
their private 9ector counterparts, agency officials attempt to predict job performance, honesty, or the possibility of a security risk,
and investigations into these areas are a necessary part of this process of prediction. The ability to predict accurately involves significant interests of the agency and of those persons subject to investigation. Both the agency and the subjects of investigation share a
desire for investigations which will readily distinguish desireable
and undesireable employees and applicants. For example, the
agency does not want unqualified persons likely to commit dishonest acts to be hired or retained. Persons who are qualified hope to
be identified as such, and those who pose little danger to the
agency do not wish to be identified as persons posing a substantial
risk. Likewise, the agency does not wish to exclude capable employees because the agency has identified them erroneously as unqualified or dangerous.
The more a predictive system seeks to identify persons posing
particular risks, however, the more likely it is to identify incor150. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (1982).
151. Blevins v. Plummer, 613 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1980); Trinidad v. United States Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 2 Gov'T Disc. SERv. (P-H) 81,322 (N.D. IlM.1980).
152. Blevins v. Plummer, 613 F.2d 767, 768 (9th Cir. 1980). The distinction between
factual matters and opinions and conclusions is often difficult to draw. For purposes of the
Privacy Act, the characterization of a record entry as fact or opinion rests upon the rationale for the distinction-whether the matter is subject to resolution through the trial process.
Some opinions may be amenable to judicial resolution although the burden of showing error
will be great. R.R. v. Dep't of the Army, 482 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1980) (plaintiff desired
anonymity).
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rectly persons who do not pose such risks. Every predictive system
must draw some lines; some decision must be made concerning the
factors relevant in predicting future behavior. Factors must be isolated which are closely related to the behavior being predicted. In
addition to carefully considered criteria for prediction, a predictive
system must have accurate data. Many of the requirements of the
Privacy Act help to assure the accuracy of the data.15
The Privacy Act also addresses the appropriate criteria for
prediction. Because privacy plays an important role in the development of private associations,'" the Act prohibits, with certain exceptions, the collection of information regarding an individual's exercise of first amendment rights. 55 The fear that the power of
government will be used to impose political conformity motivates
these restrictions, and this fear is particularly relevant when the
government investigates present or potential federal employees.
The requirements of the Privacy Act also influence the criteria
for prediction by allowing individuals to view their investigatory
records. Individuals are provided with some insight into the criteria and thereby are given some basis for challenging and perhaps
156
altering these criteria.
The application of the federal Privacy Act to investigatory
programs that are predictive both vindicates the interests of the
subjects of the investigation and protects the effectiveness of these
programs. The decisions of the courts, in the main, further the
goals of the Act, goals which are also an implicit part of a properly
administered predictive scheme.
Reconciliation of the Privacy Act with employee investigations
seeking to determine whether the employee committed a particular
153. Among the requirements helping to assure the accuracy of the data are: 1) that the
information derive whenever appropriate from the individual who is the subject of the investigation; 2) that the agency maintain timely, accurate and relevant materials; 3) that the
subject of the investigation have access to the investigatory records; and 4) that the subject

be allowed to challenge the content of the records.
154. An excellent discussion of the importance of personal privacy to political association is found in A. WEsTm, PRIvAcY AND FREEDOM 42-51 (1967). Westin notes that the mark
of tyranny is secrecy for the regime accompanied by the regime's knowledge of the activities
of all other groups. Id. at 21-23.
155. 5 U.S.C. § 552(e)(7) (1982).
156. To the extent that the use of the criteria is prohibited by law, the courts provide
an avenue of redress. The possibility of exposure of questionable criteria likely influences
government officials against the use of these criteria. Also, knowledge of the basis for decisions allows use of the political process to seek redress administratively or legislatively.
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act while on duty poses different problems. Investigations of employee misconduct or violation of agency rules and regulations do
not seek to develop data by which to predict how the employee will
behave in the future. Rather, they only seek to determine whether
the employee has committed a particular act for which a penalty
may be imposed. 157 While the requirements of the Privacy Act help
to assure an accurate and fair determination, in many instances
other procedures available to the employee accomplish a similar
purpose."' Unfortunately, judicial decisions do not draw explicitly
the distinction between predictive and enforcement investigations,
and as a result may apply the requirements of the Act to impede
unnecessarily enforcement investigations. 59
Reconciliation of the Privacy Act with investigations of applicants and employee benefits from the attention given to these investigations in the development of the Act. The Privacy Act addressed the problems posed by these investigations, and melded
the requirements of the Act with the purpose of investigations of
applicants and employees.
B. Discipline and Other Personnel Actions
Like any employer, government agencies regularly take actions
which affect the status, rights, benefits, and working conditions of
public employees. Employees have brought suits under open meeting laws, freedom of information provisions and privacy acts in response to these personnel actions. A number of the personnel ac157. In a broad sense, even on-duty conduct provides a basis for prediction. The efficiency of the service standard for discipline, 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (1982), requires that the agency
believe the conduct demonstrates that the employee's behavior will disrupt the service.
When the investigation is used as the basis for the transfer or reassignment of an employee,
the agency also predicts that a change in assignment or location is likely to alter the employee's behavior or change the impact of the conduct on the administration of government.
In these situations, however, little debate surrounds the appropriate criteria or the relevance
of the specific conduct. Therefore, use of investigations for determining whether a particular
act has been committed while the employee is on duty is different than the use of investigations of applicants or of the off-duty conduct of employees.
158. For example, disciplinary actions in the federal government must comply with a
number of procedural and substantive requirements. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7513, 7701 (1982). The
relationship of the procedural safeguards in public employment to remedies provided by
open government laws is discussed infra at notes 192-98.
159. See, e.g., Johnson v. IRS, 2 Gov'T Disc. SERV. (P-H) %81,370 (W.D. Tex. 1981)
(requirement to acquire information where practicable from the subject of the
investigation).
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tions which have given rise to litigation under open government
laws relate to the actions of agency officials normally subject to
review.16 0 These types of personnel actions, such as removals, disability retirements, suspensions, reprimands, reductions in force,
reassignments, injury compensation, equal employment com-

plaints, classification decisions, performance ratings, and griev-

ances, provide articulated procedures for redress. 161 These procedures vary in complexity and in formality, but each provides a
method of appeal either within the agency or outside and an opportunity to reexamine the initial decision of agency officials.
A second group of personnel actions giving rise to litigation
under open government laws concerns the actions of agency officials not ordinarily subject to review." 2 These types of personnel
160. Federal cases include: Hernandez v. Alexander, 671 F.2d 402 (10th Cir. 1982) (disciplinary proceeding); Richards v. Mileski, 662 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (forced resignation);
Volz v. United States Dep't of Justice, 619 F.2d 49 (10th Cir. 1980) (withholding of evaluation reports); Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (grievance); Cazalas v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 660 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1981) (removal); Lee v. United States
Dep't of Labor, 2 Gov'T Disc. SERv. (P-H) 81,335 (D. Va. 1981) (disability payments);
Murphy v. National Secuirity Agency, 2 Gov'T Disc. SERV. (P-H) 7 81,389 (D.D.C. 1981)
(promotion); Allen v. Henifin, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 581 (D.D.C. 1980) (reassignment); Hacopian v. Marshall, 2 Gov'T Disc. SERV. (P-H) 1 81,312 (D. Cal. 1980) (injury
compensation); Liguori v. Alexander, 495 F. Supp. 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (reduction in work
force); Mole v. Customs Serv., 2 Gov'T Disc. SERv. (P-H) 80,127 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (disclosure of documents); Gedden v. United States Postal Serv., 2 Gov'T Disc. S.Rv. (P-H) 81,369
(S.D. Iowa 1980) (equal opportunity complaint); Ehlschide v. Dep't of Labor, 2 Gov'T Disc.
SERV. (P-H) 1 82,228 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (disability retirement).
State jurisdictions have decided: Hudson v. School Dist. of Kansas City, 578 S.W.2d 301
(Mo. App. 1979) (reassignment); McAulay v. Board of Educ., 61 A.D.2d 1048, 403 N.Y.S.2d
116 (1978) (unsatisfactory performance rating), afl'd, 48 N.Y.2d 659, 396 N.E.2d 1033, 421
N.Y.S.2d 560 (1979); Cole v. Woodcliff Lake Bd. of Educ., 155 N.J. Super. 398, 382 A.2d 966
(1977) (removal); Lamolinara v. Barger, 30 Pa. Commw. 307, 373 A.2d 788 (1977) (removal);
Gabriel v. Turner, 50 A.D.2d 889, 377 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1975) (reduction in force); Florida
Dep't of Pollution Control v. State Career Serv. Comm'n, 320 So. 2d 846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (removal); Arkansas State Police Comm'n v. Davidson, 253 Ark. 1090, 490 S.W.2d 788
(1973) (removal); Tingling v. Lang, 39 Misc. 2d 338, 240 N.Y.S.2d 633 (Sup. Ct. 1963)
(classification).
161. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. §§ 754.105 (1982) (procedure for appeal of removal or other
disciplinary action); 831.1204 (c), 831.1205 (appeal from decision concerning disability retirement); 752.405 (procedure to appeal suspension); 351.901 (appeal from a reduction in
work force); 177.109 (appeal from injury compensation); 511.601-.615 (appeal of a classification decision); 432.206 (appeal of performance rating).
162. Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F.2d 327 (11th Cir. 1982) (disclosure to citizens); Parks v.
IRS, 618 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1980) (savings bond drive); Albright v. United States, 631 F.2d
915 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (videotape of conversation); Johnson v. United States Dep't of the Air
Force, 526 F. Supp. 679 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (acceptance of employees' petition); Church v.
United States, 2 Gov'T Disc. SERv. (P-H) 1 81,350 (D. Md. 1980) (investigation of employ-
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actions, such as posting sign-in/sign-out sheets, encouraging employees to participate in savings bond or charity drives, checking
the whereabouts of absent employees, videotaping or otherwise recording conversations with employees, counseling an employee regarding job performance, receiving a petition or request from other
employees, making statements to the press, and making recommendations to potential employers of employees who have left the

agency, provide no articulated standards for review.
In this second category, litigation under open government laws
focuses specifically upon the information practices of the public
employer. These civil actions illustrate that absent open government laws, employees usually lack a legal basis for challenging
these agency practices. In the former category, however, litigation
under open government laws seeks to acquire information for use

in other administrative or judicial proceedings. In many instances,
employees seek to substitute or complement existing procedures
with the remedies of open government laws.

1. Personnelactions not normally subject to review. Because
employees often challenge the collection and use by the agency of
information regarding specific employees, they often invoke the

Privacy Act. Judicial decisions which apply the Privacy Act in such
cases examine the character of restraints which properly should be
placed upon specific agency practices. The courts have rejected

employee contentions that the Privacy Act prohibits officials from
posting sign-in/sign-out sheets,16 3 a supervisor from entering his
evaluations of the employee's performance into the employee's per-

sonnel file without following the notice provisions required by the
Privacy Act, 1" a manager from passing a petition concerning an
ees' whereabouts); American Fed. of Gov't Employees v. NASA, 482 F. Supp. 281 (S.D. Tex.
1980) (sign-in/sign-out sheet); Savarese v. United States Dep't of HEW, 479 F. Supp. 304
(N.D. Ga. 1979) (employment recommendation), aft'd, 620 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1078 (1981); Jones v. Veterans Admin., 1 Gov'T Disc. SERv. (P-H) 79,198
(E.D. Wash. 1979) (employment recommendation); Houston v. United States Dep't of
Trees., 494 F. Supp. 24 (D.D.C. 1979) (performance counseling).
A grievance might be possible in many of these actions, but grievance procedures likely
will not be used. First, the scope of agency grievance procedures will probably be limited.
See 5 C.F.R. pt. 771 (1982) (agency administration grievance system). Second, the management rights provision of the Civil Service Reform Act makes it unlikely that a grievance
could result in the alteration of agency practices. 5 U.S.C. § 7106 (1982).
163. American Fed. of Gov't Employees v. NASA, 482 F. Supp. 281 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
164. Houston v. United States Dep't of Trees., 494 F. Supp. 24 (D.D.C. 1979); 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(e)(3) (1982) requires that an individual from whom information is acquired be in-
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and an agency from
employee to appropriate agency officials,'
checking with an employee's private physician to determine if an
employee's given reason for absence was verified.' 6
In deciding these cases, the courts have avoided application of
the Privacy Act through interpretation of the terms "records" and
"systems of records.'1 6 7 Underlying the definition of the terms,
however, is the fear that another interpretation of the Privacy
Act's requirements would impede government business and that
the situations considered are not ones involving policies of the Act.
For example, in holding that the agency need not give the employee notice under the Act before entering evaluation of the employee's work in his personnel file, one court emphasized that the

information transmitted was not covered by the Privacy Act because it related "directly to official government business."' 6 8 Moreover, supervisors enjoy considerable discretion in compiling information for use in their supervisor capacities. A supervisor may,
without violating the Privacy Act, privately take notes to refresh
his memory in preparing evaluation or promotion reports or job
assignment recommendations.'6 e The notes, however, must be kept
they
private; if the notds are included as part of agency records,
17 0
become subject to the requirements of the Privacy Act.
formed of the authority for its collection and the purposes and uses to which the information will be put.
165. Johnson v. Air Force, 526 F. Supp. 679 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
166. Church v. United States, 2 Gov'T Disc. SERv. (P-H) 81,350 (D. Md. 1980).
167. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
168. Houston v. United States Dep't of Tress., 494 F. Supp. 24, 28 (D.D.C. 1979). The
court in American Fed. of Gov't Employees v. NASA, 482 F. Supp. 281 (S.D. Tex. 1980),
emphasized that sign-in/sign-out sheets were not covered by the Act's definition of records
because they did not contain information "reflective of some quality of characteristic or the
individual." In Johnson and Church, the court relied upon the failure of the information to
be made part of any organized agency records.
169. Chapman v. NASA, 682 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1982); Waldrop v. Air Force, 3 Gov'T
Disc. SERV. (P-H) 1 83,016 (S.D. Ill. 1981) (complaint letters retained by the supervisor
became part of agency records).
170. Chapman v. NASA, 682 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1982). One of the crucial requirements
is that the notes be made part of the agency's records in a timely manner. The notes would
be considered timely if incorporated by the time of the next evaluation or report. Cf.
Thompson v. United States Dep't of Transp., 547 F. Supp. 274 (S.D. Fla. 1982). If not so
incorporated, the notes must remain private and be used only to refresh the memory of the
supervisor. The court in Chapman feared that incorporation of notes inconsistent with the
official record would deprive an employee of the opportunity to rebut information at the
time when the employee also remembered the event. In Chapman, the court also required
an agency to disclose in the FederalRegister that it incorporated private notes which would
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The courts have recognized that disclosure of information to
prospective employers or to the press creates a more difficult problem. Release of information from a system of records without the
individual's consent violates the Privacy Act. 1 In these release
cases, the courts have struggled with the question of whether a supervisor's comments regarding the employee which were based
upon the supervisor's memory should be treated as the disclosure
of information from a system of records. If the agency official has
independently acquired the information and discloses it from
memory, the Privacy Act does not apply even if the information is
contained in a system of records.17 2 If, however, the official's
knowledge rests upon the record, even if acquired before the record
was made part of a system of records, the Privacy Act applies regardless of whether or not the disclosure is made from memory. 17
These decisions regarding supervisors seek to ensure, within the
confines of the Privacy Act, that supervisors may continue to act
upon their personal contact with employees and their experience
with them. Moreover, they illustrate that courts will not apply the
Privacy Act to alter the fundamental character of the relationship
between supervisor and subordinate.
When agency actions involve important policies of the Privacy
Act, however, the courts have applied the Act even when the applicability of the Act was unclear. The Tenth Circuit has found that,
absent an exception for routine uses, the use of personnel records
to further the agency's savings bond drive violated the Privacy
Act.' 4 Similarly, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
has held the clandestine videotaping of an exchange between an
agency official and employees regarding a classification dispute to
be violative of the Act's prohibition against the collection of
records describing the exercise of first amendment rights. 17 5 Even
though the discussion concerned agency personnel practices directly affecting the employees, complaints by employees to their
be used to contradict periodic official evaluations.
171. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1982).
172. Jones v. Veterans Admin., 1 GOv'T Disc. SERV. (P-H) 1 79,198 (E.D. Wash. 1979);
Savarese v. United States Dep't of HEW, 479 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d
298 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1078 (1981); King v. Califano, 471 F. Supp. 180
(D.D.C. 1979).
173. Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F.2d 327 (11th Cir. 1982).
174. Parks v. IRS, 618 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1980).
175. Albright v. United States, 631 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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supervisors were held to be protected by the first amendment. 7 '
Moreover, the court construed the Act's protection of the exercise
of first amendment rights to apply without regard to the fact that
the videotape was made part of a system of records covered by the

Act.

177

Employees have relied upon the Privacy Act in the situations
described above precisely because they generally lack any other
way of challenging agency policy or seeking legal redress. Some of
the actions seem motivated by a desire to use the law to address
personal grievances arising out of the superior-subordinate relationship;17 8 others seem directed to more general agency practices
over which employees have little control.17 In particular, former
employees have few avenues for seeking redress for misconduct by
agency officials in giving recommendations to prospective employers or in making comments to the press,1 80 and as a result they
have looked to the Privacy Act for relief.
2. Personnel actions normally subject to review. When an
agency's personnel action is subject to review, an employee may
use an open government law to obtain information in preparation
176. Id. at 920. The Supreme Court recently limited the scope of first amendment protection of communications between employees and their supervisors. The Court emphasized
that the character of first amendment protection rests upon whether the speech related to a
matter of public interest and concern. According to the Court, not all matters concerning
internal office policies constitute matters of public interest and concern. Connick v. Myers,
103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983).
177. Albright v. United States, 631 F.2d at 919-20. On remand, employees were unable
to recover damages because they could not show any adverse effect. Albright v. United
States, 3 Gov'T Disc. SERV. (P-H) 83,025 (D.D.C. 1982).
178. E.g., Brookens v. United States, 627 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Church v. United
States, 2 Gov'T Disc. SERV. (P-H) %81,350 (D. Md. 1980); Houston v. United States Dep't of
Treas., 494 F. Supp. 24 (D.D.C. 1979).
179. American Fed. of Gov't Employees v. NASA, 482 F. Supp. 281 (S.D. Tex. 1980);
Parks v. IRS, 618 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1980). An agency has a duty to inform an employee if
a supervisor has invaded his privacy without permission; the supervisor has no grounds to
object to disclosure of the violation. Bartel v. United States Fed. Aviation Auth., 3 Gov'T
Disc. SERV. (P-H) 1 83,003 (D.D.C. 1982).
180. The Supreme Court in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1958), adopted an absolute
immunity for federal employees acting within the scope of their duties. In most instances,
recommendations fall within the scope of the duty of supervisory and management officials.
The Supreme Court also held that civil service employees may not sue their superiors for
violation of constitutional rights under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Because of the elaborate laws protecting federal employees from arbitrary action, the Court has declined to create new legal liability
without legislative aid. Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct. 2404 (1983).
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for that review. These laws also provide access to information useful in determining whether judicial as well as administrative review
should be sought in the first place.
Open government provisions are crucial for the acquisition of
information by the employee when the review procedures do not
give the employee access to the desired information. For example,
before enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,11 review

procedures for removals, demotions, lengthy suspensions, and reductions in force by the Civil Service Commission limited employee access to information held by the agency, and the Commission lacked subpoena power to aid the employee. 182 Grievances,
equal employment opportunity complaints, and employee appeals
of injury compensation decisions fail to provide an employee with
access to considerable information that might be useful in challenging the agency's action. In these situations, open government
laws serve as a substitute for discovery procedures by providing
information enabling an employee to evaluate and to pursue his
claims.
However, the Privacy Act exempts from access material prepared in reasonable anticipation of a civil action or proceeding.1 83
This exception has been broadly interpreted to extend beyond material that would be protected by the traditional attorney work
product privilege.18 4 The scope of this exemption and therefore its
impact upon the use of the Privacy Act as a form of discovery by
employees depends upon whether a court interprets civil actions
and proceedings to encompass a quasi-judicial administrative proceeding.18 5 The deliberative privilege contained within the exemp-

tions to the FOIA encompasses the attorney work product privilege
and protects the deliberative process, but does not extend as far as
the exemption contained in the Privacy Act. 88 Therefore, FOIA
181.

5 U.S.C. § 1205(b)(2) (1982).

182. See Williams v. Zuckert, 372 U.S. 765 (1963) (per curiam), vacating 296 F.2d 416
(D.C. Cir. 1961).
183. Hernandez v. Alexander, 671 F.2d 402 (10th Cir. 1982).
184. Id. at 408.
185. The court might protect documents compiled in a removal case even if the term
civil action or proceeding was not extended to quasi-judicial administrative proceedings. Because removal actions are ultimately subject to judicial review, 5 U.S.C. § 7703 (1982), removal actions might involve a reasonable anticipation of a civil action.
186. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1982); see also NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 421 U.S. 132,
154 (1975) (recognizing attorney workproduct privilege exemption within FOIA); Robbins,
Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 214 (1978) (verbatim witness statements are within
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certain information not availamay provide the employee access to
1 87
Act.
Privacy
the
under
him
ble to
Reconciliation of the use of open government laws with discovery methods in other proceedings often occurs with the application
of open government provisions, particularly the FOIA. With public
employment cases, the courts follow the principles generally applicable when open government laws are used as substitutes for discovery." 8 Generally, actions under open government laws will not
delay other proceedings. 18 9 The discovery rules of a proceeding operate independently of the application of the FOIA; 9 0 in FOIA litigation, the purpose for which the requester seeks the information
usually remains irrelevant to the application of the provision." 1

Open government laws are also utilized as substitutes for review procedures available under public employment provisions.
Because the Privacy Act provides for the amendment of a record
and in some circumstances for damages against an agency, 192 the
Privacy Act may be substituted as a basis for actions explicitly
provided under public employment provisions."' For example, an
employee may seek to remove a reprimand from his file by seeking

to amend his records under the Privacy Act rather than pursuing
agency grievance procedures. 9

However, by failing to use availa-

FOIA work product privilege), rev'g 563 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1977).
187. Martin v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 2 Gov'T Disc. SERv. (P-H) 82,416 (D.D.C.
1982).
188. See generally Toran, Information Disclosure in Civil Actions: The Freedom of
Information Act and the Federal Discovery Rules, 49 Gzo. WAsH. L. REv. 843 (1981).
189. Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1 (1974).
190. Id. at 22.
191. Hoover v. United States Dep't of Interior, 611 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1980).
192. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2) (1982). To recover, a person must show the adverse effect
resulting from an unfavorable determination relating to qualification, character, rights, opportunities or benefits and intentional or willful agency conduct. Recovery is limited to actual damages. The Eleventh Circuit has held that actual damage is limited to proven pecuniary loss. Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F.2d 327 (11th Cir. 1982). Absent proof of actual damages,
a plaintiff is entitled to recover only the statutory minimum of $1,000.
193. FOIA provides a less attractive alternative because the only remedy under FOIA is
release of the documents. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982). Neither amendment nor damages
are available under FOIA.
194. Kennedy v. Andrus, 459 F. Supp. 240 (D.D.C. 1978). If the employee is able to
seek redress under the Privacy Act, the employee obtains judicial review of the agency determination. Since a reprimand is not a disciplinary action for which there is administrative
review outside of the agency, the employee is left with the agency's resolution of his grievance under an agency grievance provision. Under a negotiated grievance provision, the employee would be able to obtain binding arbitration should his union decide to pursue the
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ble grievance procedures, an employee may be collaterally attacking a final decision of the agency. 19 5 In order to protect the integrity of the procedures established for review of personnel actions,
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has held that an
employee should not be allowed to substitute the Privacy Act for
established grievance procedures.""
The Privacy Act may also provide a complementary remedy.
Whether or not an employee may pursue a Privacy Act claim in
conjunction with procedures included in public employment provisions depends upon whether or not the public employment provision can be interpreted as providing an exclusive remedy. If the
public employment provisions do not preclude redress under the
Privacy Act, an employee must still follow the procedures set forth
in the Privacy Act. 97 However, Privacy Act claims are not necessarily foreclosed by either a successful or unsuccessful use of procedures for public employment provisions. 9 8 The Privacy Act may
foreclose claims that previously had been available under public
employment provisions. For example, the Court of Claims has held
that in suits for back pay before the court, the Privacy Act provides the exclusive remedy for one aggrieved by derogatory material in his files generated by his removal. 99 Therefore, the Privacy
Act withdraws the consent of the government to suit except under
that Act.
Finally, an open government law may also provide a basis for
overturning an agency action not taken in public session as required by such a law. While the federal Government in the Sunshine Act may not provide for overturning an agency decision because the Act is violated, 0 0 many state open meeting laws do allow
the violation of their provisions to serve as a basis for reversing an
administrative decision. 20 1 An open meeting provision therefore
may provide a method of challenging an agency personnel action
grievance to arbitration.
195. Id. at 242.
196. White v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 589 F.2d 713 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979).
197. Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
198. Fiorella v. United States Dep't of HEW, 2 Gov'T Disc. SERV. (P-H) 1 81,363 (W.D.
Wash. 1981).
199. Fiorentino v. United States, 607 F.2d 963 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
200. See supra note 28.
201. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
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independent of review under public employment laws.2 02 Some
state courts have treated violations as requiring reversal of administrative decisions taken during improperly closed meetings,20°
while other state courts have allowed violations of open meeting
laws to be a significant consideration in deciding whether a particular administrative decision should be reversed.20 4
3. Reconciliation of policies involved in discipline and other
personnel actions. The application of open government provisions
to disciplinary and other personnel actions highlights the distinctive character of public employment law. Public employment law
provides no redress for many personnel decisions which may aggrieve employees, and thus places considerable discretion with
agency officials. Review procedures often are quite limited in scope
and fail to provide the employee with access to agency information
that an employee might find useful in determining whether to seek
review or to pursue redress. These aspects of public employment
provisions explain why employees often use an open government
law in connection with agency personnel actions.
In their application of open government laws, courts have refused to allow open government laws to be used to reduce agency
discretion in personnel actions or to alter the character of the employment relationship. Courts have been particularly sensitive to
preserving the established avenues of review provided in public
employment provisions. It is only when the policies of the open
government laws have been clearly at stake that the courts have
allowed the use of open government provisions to alter agency personnel practices. This traditional deference of the courts to executive agencies in personnel matters therefore limits the application
of open government provisions to discipline and other agency per202. E.g., Hudson v. School Dist., 578 S.W.2d 301 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Cole v. Woodcliff Lake Bd. of Educ., 155 N.J. Super. 398, 382 A.2d 966 (1978).
203. Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974); Times Publishing Co.
v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Emmanuel Baptist Church v. North
Cornwall Township, 26 Pa. Commw. 427, 364 A.2d 536 (1976); Toyah Indep. School Dist. v.
Pecos-Barstow Indep. School Dist., 466 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). See also Channel
10, Inc. v. Independent School Dist. 709, 298 Minn. 306, 215 N.W.2d 814 (1974) (agency bylaws in violation of open meetings laws would be voided if such relief had been requested).
But see Anti-Administration Ass'n v. North Fayette County Comm. School Dist., 206
N.W.2d 723 (Iowa 1973) (even if "open meetings" law was violated, action taken was neither
void nor voidable).
204. Hudson v. School Dist., 578 S.W.2d 301 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
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sonnel actions.
C. Ethics and Accountability.
Third parties can seek information about the operation of government through open government laws. Much of this information
concerns public employees, including names and addresses of employees and former employees, 05 applications for employment,10
compensation and salary information,20 7 attendance records, 208 personnel files, 209 performance evaluations, 210 personnel investigations, 211 injury claims, 21 2 allegations of misconduct or official abuse
of power,213 and conflicts of interest." 4

Third party access to such information concerning public employees often conflicts with the privacy interests of those employ205. E.g., Heimerle v. Attorney Gen., 1 Gov'T Disc. SEav. (P-H) 80,023 (DD.C. 1980);
Woo v. Reinhardt, 2 Gov'T Disc. SERv. (P-H) 1 82,080 (D.D.C. 1981); Palm v. United States
Dep't of State, 1 Gov'T Disc. Saav. (P-H) 80,296 (D.D.C. 1980); Simpson v. Vance, 648
F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Gannett Co. v. County of Monroe, 59 A.D.2d 309, 399 N.Y.S.2d 534
(1977) (terminated employees), aft'd, 45 N.Y.2d 954, 383 N.E.2d 1151, 411 N.Y.S.2d 557
(1978); New York Teachers Pension Ass'n v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 71 A.D.2d 250, 422
N.Y.S.2d 389 (1979) (retired teachers); State v. Public Employees' Retirement Sys., 60 Ohio
St. 2d 93, 397 N.E.2d 1191 (1979) (retired employees); Mergenthaler v. Pennsylvania State
Employees' Retirement Bd., 33 Pa. Commw. 237, 372 A.2d 944 (1977) (retired employees);
Aswell v. Lunt, 375 So. 2d 142 (La. 1979), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 434 (La. 1979).
206. Douglas v. Michel, 410 So. 2d 936 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Board of Educ. v.
Memphis Pub. Co., 585 S.W.2d 629 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979); Kenai v. Kenai Peninsula
Newpapers, 642 P.2d 1316 (Alaska 1982); City of Dubuque v. Telegraph Herald, Inc., 297
N.W.2d 523 (Iowa 1980); Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., 379 So. 2d 633
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
207. Redding v. Jacobsen, 638 P.2d 503 (Utah 1981); Mans v. Lebanon School Bd., 112
N.H. 160, 290 A.2d 866 (1972); People v. Janura, 59 IlM. App. 3d 143, 376 N.E.2d 22 (1978);
Penokie v. Michigan Tech. Univ., 93 Mich. App. 650, 287 N.W.2d 304 (1979).
208. E.g., Kanzelmeyer v. Eger, 16 Pa. Commw. 495, 329 A.2d 307 (1974).
209. News Press Publishing Co. v. Wisher, 345 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1977); Trenton Times
Corp. v. Board of Educ., 138 N.J. Super. 357, 351 A.2d 30 (1976).
210. Trahan v. Larivee, 365 So. 2d 294 (La. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 366 So. 2d 564
(La. 1979); Ridenour v. Board of Educ., 111 Mich. App. 798, 314 N.W.2d 760 (1981).
211. Farrell v. Village Bd. of Trustees, 83 Misc. 2d 125, 372 N.Y.S.2d 905 (Sup. Ct.
1975); City Council of Santa Monica v. Superior Court, 204 Cal. App. 2d 68, 21 Cal. Rptr.
896 (1962).
212. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 471 F. Supp. 1023
(D.D.C. 1979).
213. Stern v. Small Business Admin., 516 F. Supp. 145 (D.D.C. 1980); Columbia Packing Co. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 563 F.2d 495 (1st Cir. 1977); The Rake v. Gorodetsky, 452 A.2d 1144 (R.I. 1982).
214. Washington Post v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Resources, 2 Gov'T
Disc. Sanv. (P-H) 1 81,047 (D.D.C. 1980).
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ees. Accordingly, resolution of this conflict rests heavily upon the
perceived character of public employment and the status of public
employees. Most open government laws resolve this conflict either
through the definition of information to which the public is entitled or through specific provisions protecting the privacy interests
of public employees. Given the practical realities of our expansive
federal system, the resolution occurs in general terms and varies
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.2 1 5
Laws requiring public financial disclosure by high ranking
public officials constitute a body of open government laws which
specifically address the conflict between access and privacy. The
analysis of various courts, therefore, may differ more in interpreting general provisions than in interpreting financial disclosure
laws. This section, therefore, discusses public financial disclosure
laws separately.
1. The conflict between public access and employee privacy
in federal law. The federal Freedom of Information Act illustrates
how open government laws address the privacy interests of public
employees. The FOIA contains three exemptions which directly
concern the types of information regarding federal employees
likely to be sought by third parties. 216 The Act exempts from disclosure documents or records that are "related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency. '217 In addition, an
agency may withhold "personnel and medical files and similar files
the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 1 " A more limited privacy provision
applies to investigatory records. 219 The exemption relating solely to
215. Access to certain types of materials, such as salary information, may be specifically
resolved by some state legislatures. See, e.g., Penokie v. Michigan Tech. Univ., 93 Mich.
App. 650, 287 N.W.2d 304 (1979) (after decision but before publication of same, the Michigan legislature enacted Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.243 (1)(a), which mirrors the holding in
Penokie by mandating disclosure of salary records of employees); Redding v. Jacobsen, 638
P.2d 503 (Utah 1981) (the disclosure of personally identifiable salary information is forbidden by the Publication of Higher Education Salary Data Act of 1979, Utah Code Ann. § 53-

48a-1).
216. Certain documents, such as appointment calendars, may not be treated as agency
records if the documents were not generated by the agency and the agency does not seek to
retain or control the documents. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs v. United States Dep't of Justice, 3

Gov'T Disc. SERv. (P-H) %83,082 (D.D.C. 1983).
217.

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1982).

218.
219.

Id.
Id.

§ 552(b)(6).
§ 552(b)(7)(C). The seventh exemption allows an agency to withhold law en-
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internal personnel matters is narrowly construed. 220 This is because it is believed that if the public has a legitimate interest in
the material, the material does not relate solely to internal personnel matters and should be released.2 2 1
Because of the narrow scope of the exemption for internal personnel rules and practices, the protection of the privacy interests
of federal employees must fall primarily upon the exemption for
personnel and medical files and similar files creating a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. According to the United
States Supreme Court, the protection of this material depends
principally upon whether the files contain intimate and embarrassing details regarding the individual.222 The Supreme Court has emphasized that the privacy interests to be protected, rather than the
structure of the records in which the information appears, should
control interpretation of the exemption. 223 For example, even if biographical information regarding an employee is extracted from a
personnel fie, the resulting document is not protected if it contains no information of an intimate or embarrassing nature.2 2 '
Although a file contains intimate or embarrassing information
about an employee, release of the information may be required unless the release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy. 2 25 In determining whether release creates a prohibited invasion of the right to privacy, a court must balance the
public's interests in access against the individual's interests in privacy.22 A substantial invasion of privacy interests may be warranted if an important public purpose is to be served by release,
forcement records if the agency can demonstrate that one of six specific harms will follow.
One of these harms is that the release of the information would constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy. Commentators disagree as to whether the deletion from (7)(C)
of the term "clearly," appearing in the sixth exemption, by the conference committee during
consideration of the 1974 amendments to the Act lessens the showing which an agency must
make. Compare FEDERAL INORMATON DisCLOSUPE, supra note 2, at 17-26, with Ellsworth,
Amended Exemption 7 of the Freedom of Information Act, 25 AM. U.L. REv. 37, 48 (1975).
Regardless of the weight attached to privacy interests, both (b)(6) and (b)(7)(C) require a
balancing of interests.
220. Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
221. Id. at 369.
222. Id. at 376-77.
223. State Dep't v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982).
224. Simpson v. Vance, 648 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
225. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1982).
226. Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 380-82 (1976).
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while a less severe invasion may be clearly unwarranted when not
balanced by a competing public purpose. Decisions which discuss
requests for the names and addresses of federal employees ilustrate the balancing of interests. Since these requests implicate privacy interests,2 27 their release has been held to be an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy if the onLy purpose. for the release of
the information is commercial.228 If, however, the requester seeks
the names in an effort to appeal to employees or former employees
to join an organization representing specific interests, at least one
court has held that such might constitute a sufficient public purpose which might warrant release.2 29
In some instances, even significant invasions of personal privacy may be warranted. Normally, a citizen has little interest in
the career of an individual employee, 23 0 and no substantial public
purpose is served by access to intimate or embarrassing details regarding the employee. Whether a public interest is sufficient to
warrant release of embarrassing information depends upon the articulation of the interest and the weight attached to it. One instance where the public interest in the careers of individual federal
employees warrants substantial weight is when the employee has
been discharged for bribery. 3 1 In these circumstances, the personnel records of the particular employee provide the public with necessary information about the involvement of other officials and aid
in the formulation of measures to be taken to prevent the reoccurrence of such events.23 2 Beyond this, the weight to be assigned to
the public interest varies. The public interest in the performance
of an official's duties may not be sufficient when release affects significant privacy interests, 23 3 nor may general allegations of agency
misconduct be sufficient to implicate a public interest necessary to
examine the intimate or embarrassing details of an individual's
227. Heimerle v. Attorney Gen., 1 Gov'T Disc. SERv. (P-H) 1 80,023 (D.D.C. 1980); Disabled Officers Ass'n v. Brown, 1 Gov'T Disc. SEnv. (P-H) 1 79,182 (D.D.C. 1979).
228. See Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974). A similar result
follows if the requester has only narrow personal reasons for seeking the information.
Heimerle v. Attorney Gen., 1 Gov'T Disc. Sav. (P-H) %80,023 (D.D.C. 1980).
229. Disabled Officers Ass'n v. Brown, 1 GoV'T Disc. SERv. (P-H)
79,182 (D.D.C.

1979).
230. Columbia Packing Co. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 563 F.2d 495, 499 (1st. Cir.
1977).
231. Id. at 499-500.
232. Id.
233.

Stern v. Small Business Admin., 516 F. Supp. 145, 149 (D.D.C. 1980).
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234

These decisions give considerable weight to the privacy interests of federal employees at the cost of public scrutiny over the
operation of government. In particular, the requirement that a specific factual record of wrongdoing be established to create a legitimate public interest in individual careers reduces the use of open
government provisions to inquire into suspected misconduct by individual officials. The public interest is substantial so long as the
information sought relates to the performance of an individual employee in a significant public program. The privacy of federal employees may better be reconciled with public evaluation of government if consideration is given to the rank of the official and the
importance of the official in the success or failure of the particular
program.
The exemptions to the federal Freedom of Information Act are
permissive in that they do not require the agency to withhold information and they do not serve as absolute prohibitions against
release.2 3 5 However, this permissive character may inadequately
protect the interests shielded by the Act.236 In contrast, the privacy
exemption of the Freedom of Information Act is mandatory. If the
information falls under a protected category and its release would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, the
agency is barred from releasing it. The mandatory character of the
privacy exemption is a result of the relationship between the privacy exemptions of the FOIA and the federal Privacy Act. If release of the information constitutes a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy, then its release is barred by the Privacy Act.237

234. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 471 F. Supp. 1023
(D.D.C. 1979). The court distinguished Columbia Packing by noting that those officials
whose records were sought had been convicted of bribery, which created a legitimate public
interest in their careers. Id. at 1029. Assumptions of wrongdoing are insufficient to create a
public interest strong enough to outweigh the privacy interests of the individual employees.
Id. at 1029-30.
235. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
236. Patten & Weinstein, Disclosure of Business Secrets Under the Freedom of Information Act: Suggested Limitations, 29 AD. L. REV. 193 (1976); Note, Protecting Confidential Business Information from Federal Agency Disclosure After Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,
80 COLUM. L. REV. 109, 112-13 (1980). An excellent article discussing actions seeking to restrain disclosure is Campbell, Reverse Freedom of Information Act Litigation: The Need
for Congressional Action, 67 GEo. L.J. 103 (1978).
237.

PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SO-

cIETy 520 (1977). See Note, The Freedom of Information Act's Privacy Exemption and the
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Accordingly, the privacy exemption to the Freedom of Information

Act and the Privacy Act do coherently mesh."'
2. The conflict between public access and employee privacy
in state law. Resolving the conflict between access and employee
privacy in state open government laws is a more difficult problem.
State open government laws vary widely and access to information
concerning public employees depends upon the definition of public
record 2 e and the nature of exemptions contained within the spe241
cific act.240 Public record may be broadly or narrowly defined

and exemptions may be broadly or narrowly drawn.4 2 Moreover,
open government laws may consider specifically access to certain
types of information affecting the privacy interests of public employees, including access to names and addresses, 243 and salary
information.2 4
While some state open government laws provide for judicial
balancing of the public interest in access against the privacy inter-

ests of individuals similar to the federal approach,24 5 others do not
PrivacyAct of 1974, 11 HLv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 596 (1976); Note, The Privacy Act of 1974,
1976 DuKE L.J. 301.
238. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 237, at 520. At least one commentator believes, however, that the relationship is not clear. FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE, supra note 2, at § 20.13.
239. Braverman & Heppler, A PracticalReview of State Open Records Laws, 49 GPo.
WASH. L. REV. 720, 732 (1981).
240. Id. at 737-47.
241. Id. at 732-36.
242. For example, rather than prohibiting the release of information that would invade
personal privacy, a provision might more narrowly restrict release of information affecting
personal security. Personal security need not mean personal privacy. See, e.g., Kanzelmeyer
v. Eger, 16 Pa. Commw. 495, 500, 329 A.2d 307, 310 (1974) ("Security commonly means a
state of freedom from harm, danger, fear or anxiety,--a state not affected by another's
knowledge of one's illness or bereavement").
243. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1793.3(c) (West Supp. 1983); MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A, § 3(c)(x)
(Supp. 1982); TEX. STAT. ANN. § 6252-17a § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1983) (names, but not
addresses).
244. See, e.g., Redding v. Jacobsen, 638 P.2d 503 (Utah 1981) (statute exempting salary
information of employees of institutions of higher education upheld as constitutional). See
S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-40(a)(6) (Supp. 1982); TEx. STAT. ANN. § 6252-17a § 6 (Vernon Supp.
1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 317(b)(7) (Supp. 1982); WASH. REv. CODE § 41.06.160 (Supp.
1982).
245. See CALIF. GOV'T CODE § 6254 (West Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-19b
(1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10002(d) (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1524 (1981); HAwII
REv. STAT. § 92-51 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 116, § 43.6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); Ky.
REV.

STAT.

§ 61.878(1)(a) (1981);

MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.

§ 15.243(1)(a)(iii) (West 1981);

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-.5 (1977); N.Y. PUn. OFF. LAW § 89(2)(a) (McKinney Supp.
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or severely limit the character of the individual privacy interests
that can be considered.240 Some states that have freedom of information laws do not have privacy provisions. 24 When courts lack
the legislative authority to balance interests in resolving the conflict between access and employee privacy, they are left with general state or federal constitutional protections of the right of
8
privacy.

24

1982); TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a § 3(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CoDE §
42.17.310(b) (Supp. 1982).
The advisory opinions of the State of New York Committee on Open Government illustrate the way in which the balancing of interests occurs under state law. The Committee's
advisory opinions articulate two basic principles: 1) that public employees, because they are
accountable to the public, enjoy less privacy than private citizens; and 2) that the release of
records relevant to an employee's performance of public duties does not create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The Committee's opinions indicate the breadth of
records regarding public employees available to the public. These include: reprimands,
FOIL-AO-2062, June 22, 1981; the substance of citizen complaints against employees, FOILAO-1742, Oct. 29, 1980; portions of a resume relating to specific educational and experience
requirements of a job, FOIL-AO-1836, Jan. 12, 1981; name, title and salary, FOIL-AO-2452,
Apr. 27, 1982; attendance record, FOIL-AO-1778, Nov. 26, 1980; seniority lists, FOIL-AO1477, Apr. 17, 1980; records of grievance proceedings, FOIL-AO-960, Nov. 30, 1978; arbitration decision and award, FOIL-AO-1313, Nov. 23, 1979; reasons given for removal, FOILAO-1317, Nov. 26, 1979; charges filed against an employee, FOIL-AO-1338, Dec. 18, 1979;
vacation and sick leave records, FOIL-AO-1187, July 3, 1979; and certain portions of internal disclosure of interests questionnaires, FOIL-AO-2249, Oct. 30, 1981. On the other hand,
portions of documents and records not relating to the performance of duties may not be
available. E.g., place of residence, FOIL-AO-2614, Sept. 20, 1982, and home address, FOILAO-1928, Mar. 26, 1981. The opinions are less clear on disclosure of whether an appointment is temporary or permanent, FOIL-AO-2613, Sept. 20, 1982, and whether the composition of an organization by sex must be released, FOIL-AO-1298, Nov. 1, 1979.
246. See ALA. CODE § 36-12-40 (1977) (all public writings of the state available except
as otherwise provided expressly by statute); IDAHO Cons § 9-301 (1979) (any public record
available except as otherwise provided by statute); Mo. REV. STAT. § 109.180 (1966) (available except as otherwise provided by law); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-6-102(1) (1981) (available
except as otherwise expressly provided by statute); NaB. REV. STAT. § 84.712 (1976) (available except as otherwise expressly provided by statute); NEv. REV. STAT. § 239.010(1) (1981)
(available unless declared by law to be confidential); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.1 (1981) (only
confidential communications by legal counsel to a public agency are exempt); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 44-04-18 (1978) (available except as otherwise specifically provided by law). See also
Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-53-53 (Supp. 1982) (agency originating the data determines its
confidentiality).
247. These states are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. The District of Columbia also has no separate privacy act.
248. E.g., Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980).
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Because of the variety of state open government laws and the
different methods of interpreting and applying access provisions,
conclusions regarding the resolution of the conflict between privacy
and access are more difficult to draw in cases involving state law
than those concerning federal law. Despite this difficulty, the state
cases suggest that state courts are likely to give less weight to employee privacy interests than the federal courts. Several factors
support this judgment.
First, the different weight attached to employee privacy by
state courts reflects in part the different legal settings in which
state courts consider the privacy interests of public employees. The
constitutional protection of privacy interests may be less restrictive
as to access than a legislative judgment such as the one contained
in the federal Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act." 9 Specific legislative judgments contained in some laws favor access at
the expense of employee privacy interests. 50 Second, state courts
confront the conflict between access and privacy in a setting which
tends to emphasize access to personal information regarding public
employees. The number of state cases far exceeds the number of

similar federal cases, and the news media appear particularly interested in the affairs of local governmental units.2 5 This media interest combined with a substantial caseload may be reflected in

different judicial attitudes toward employee privacy.
249. The federal laws make specific legislative judgments regarding the protection of
privacy interests. Constitutional protection is less clear, and the scope of appropriate legislative judgment about access to material affecting personal privacy is therefore broad.
250. The following states provide access to all public records, have no specific exemption for employee personnel records, and have no separate privacy act: LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 44:1, :3 (West 1982); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 402 (1979); Mo. REv. STAT. § 109.180
(1966); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-712 (1976); NEv. REv. STAT. § 239.010 (1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. §

47:1A-2 (West Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.1 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18
(1978); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 24 (1962); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-27-1 (Supp. 1982);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-503 (Supp. 1982).

Four states expressly provide for specific information concerning public employees when
that information is deemed not to be confidential. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A, § 2 (Supp.
1982)(salaries of all state, county and municipal employees are public records); MCH. STAT.
ANN. § 4.1801(13a) (Supp. 1982) (salary records of school district employees are available);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 317(b) (Supp. 1983) (public records include individual salaries); Tax.

STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1983)(names, sex, ethnicity, salaries, title, and
dates of employment of all employees of the state and all its political subdivisions are public
information).
251. A substantial percentage of the state cases cited supra notes 205-13 involve local
newspapers, radio or television stations.
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The lesser weight attached to employee privacy interests reflects a different judicial perception of the character of public employment. State courts seem more willing than federal courts to
articulate a significant public interest simply because the information concerns the performance of a public employee or issues relating to public employment. 5 2 This willingness reflects a view that
public employment is significantly different than other
employment.
3. Public financial disclosure. Public financial disclosure provisions explicitly provide public access to information regarding
the private financial affairs of certain public employees. In so doing, these provisions value access above the privacy interests of individual employees. The public interests perceived to be served by
public financial disclosure include increasing public confidence in
government,25 3 providing a meaningful enforcement method for violation of conflict of interest provisions, 2 " altering the perceptions
and conduct of public employees, 255 and encouraging debate and
evaluation of conflict of interest provisions. 5 6
Despite arguments that public financial disclosure fails to reduce conflicts of interest and might even deter qualified and honest persons from seeking public employment,25 most state govern252. Compare Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 471 F.
Supp. 1023, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("ordinarily the individual careers of public servants are
of small general interest") with Kenai v. Kenai Peninsula Newspapers, 642 P.2d 1316, 1324
(Alaska 1982) ("Public Officials must recognize their official capacities often expose their
private lives to public scrutiny") (citation omitted).

253. Note, The Constitutionality of Financial Disclosure Laws, 59 CORNELL L. lRv.
345, 346 (1974).
254. Punishment of a public employee for failure to report may be much easier than
punishment for accepting a gift or holding a financial interest in a matter subject to the
employee's official action.

255. Comment, State Legislative Conflicts of Interest: An Analysis of the Alabama
Ethics Commisssion Recommendations, 23 ALA. L. REV.369, 401 (1971) (disclosure encourages legislators to be more careful when handling extra-legislative economic activities or
conflict situations).
256. Stein v. Howlett, 52 IlM. 2d 570, 578, 289 N.E.2d 409,413 (1972), appeal dismissed,
412 U.S. 925 (1973).
257. Hearingson H.R. 3249 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Gov't Relations
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 99 (1976) (testimony of Harvey
Pitt, SEC General Counsel) [hereinafter House Judiciary Hearings on H.R. 3249]. The
Council of State Governments has found some evidence suggesting that financial disclosure
adversely affects recruitment. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, STATE CONFLICT OF INTEREsT/FNANCIL DISCLOsuRE 25-26 (1975). The General Accounting Office found it "extremely
difficult, if not impossible to attribute any specific degree of federal recruiting difficulties to
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ments have adopted some form of public financial disclosure.25
With the passage of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978,259 the

federal government joined the majority of states in requiring public financial disclosure by at least some public employees. The Act
illustrates the types of questions underlying public financial disclosure provisions. Principal among these questions are who should
report, what should be reported, what information should remain
confidential, and how should disclosure be enforced.
Determining who should report focuses upon whether a grade
or salary scale or more general criteria should be used.26 0 A grade

and salary scale offers administrative efficiency, but at the cost of
covering some positions where little risk of conflicts of interest exists and excluding other positions, which although of a lower rank,
the [Federal Ethics in Government Act of 1978] or to any of its provisions." GENERAL AcCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION ON SELECTED ASPECTS OF THE ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT OF

1978 App. I, at 1 (1983) [hereinafter ETHICS ACT STUDY].
258. ALA. CODE § 36-25-14 (1975); ALASKA STAT. §§ 39.50.020-.030 (1980); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 38-542, -545 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-1630 (1979); CALIF. GOV'T CODE §§
87202-87203 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-202 (1982); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 1-83 (Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5855 (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1462
(1981 and Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. § 112.3145 (1978); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 84-17 (Supp.
1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127 § 604A-101 (Smith-Hurd 1981 & Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 4-2-6-8 (Burns 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 46-247 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-1114
(West Supp. 1983); MD. ANN. CODE art. 40A §§ 4-102, -103, 6-201 (1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 268B, § 5(b) (West Supp 1983); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 4.1701 (131) (Callaghan 1977);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10A.07, .09 (West 1977 and Supp. 1983); MIss. CODE ANN. § 25-4-25
(Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105.460 (Vernon 1966); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-2-131 (1981);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-1493 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 281.561 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1016-10 (1983); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 74(3)(j) (McKinney Supp. 1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
102.02 (Page 1978 and Supp. 1983); PA. CONS. STAT ANN. tit. 65 § 404 (Purdon Supp. 1982);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-14-15 (Supp. 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-810, -820 (1977 and Supp.
1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 3-1A-3 (1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-501, -502 (1980
and Supp. 1982); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 6252-9b(3)-(4) (Vernon Supp. 1983); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 67-16-7 (1978); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-352, -353.(B) (1979 and Supp. 1982);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.240 (Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 6B-1-1 (1979); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 19.43 (West Supp. 1982).
259. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as amended in scattered sections of tits.
2, 5, 18, 28, 39) (Supp. II - Supp. IV 1980).
260. During congressional consideration of the Ethics in Government Act, Common
Cause, a citizen lobbying group, supported the use of grade scales to avoid adniinistrative
difficulties that would be created by broad criteria. Hearings on S.555 Before the Senate
Comm. on Gov't Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 97 (1977) (testimony of Fred Werheimer). The
American Civil Liberties Union opposed coverage based on classification or pay because
"[a]dministrative or legislative convenience can never be the justification for unneccessary

invasions of privacy." Hearingson H.R.1, H.R.9, H.R.6954 Before Subcomm. on Admin. Law
and Gov't Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 503 (1977)
[hereinafter House Judiciary Hearings on H.R.1].
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pose substantial risks of conflicts of interest. Congress, through the
Ethics in Government Act, chose to use a grade scale level as a
means of defining who should report, thereby applying the provision to all high ranking federal officials.261 Constitutional challenges to the Ethics in Government Act as well as to similar state
provisions have raised equal protection objections to the classification used to require reporting. 262 Generally, these challenges have
26
been unsuccessful.
The Act requires the reporting of a variety of financial interests including earned and unearned income, 64 assets and liabilities, 265 certain transactions, 2 6 6 compensation received, 26 7 and posi261. 5 U.S.C. app. § 201 (1982).
262. See, e.g., Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1979) (Ethics in Government Act disclosure provisions as applicable to art. III judges held constitutional); Illinois State Employees Ass'n v. Walker, 57 IlM. 2d 512, 519, 315 N.E.2d 9, 13 (executive order
requiring state employees to make financial disclosures upheld), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1058
(1974); Montgomery County v. Walsh, 274 Md. 502, 525, 336 A.2d 97, 111 (1975) (county
financial disclosure statute upheld), appeal dismissed, 424 U.S. 901 (1976). Some public
officials also have challenged disclosure statutes' classification of those who must report as
unnecessarily broad. See Goldtrap v. Askew, 334 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1976); Klaus v. Minnesota
State Ethics Comm'n, 309 Minn. 430, 244 N.W.2d 672 (1976); Fritz v. Gordon, 83 Wash. 2d
275, 517 P.2d 911, 926, appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 902 (1974).
263. Some courts have found the classification of employees too broad to accomplish
the legislative purpose. Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1970); Evans v. Carey, 85 Misc. 2d 119, 379 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 53
A.D.2d 109, 385 N.Y.S.2d 965 (App. Div), afl'd, 40 N.Y.2d 1008, 359 N.E.2d 983, 391
N.Y.S.2d 393 (1976).
264. 5 U.S.C. app. § 202(a)(1)(A) (1982). Income derived from dividends, interest, rent
and capital gains exceeding $100 must be reported but only by value categories. As to other
forms of income, the employee must report the source, type, amount, and value of income
received exceeding $100.
265. Id. § 202(a)(3)-(4). Assets and liabilites must be reported within categorical values.
The Act does not distinguish between real and personal property. The Act does not require
reporting the value of a personal residence not used for the production of income, provides a
$1,000 de minimus exception, and excludes savings accounts and certificates of deposit aggregating to $5,000 or less.
266. Id. § 202(a)(5). The employee must report all transactions including a description,
date, and value involving the purchase, sale, or exchange of real property, stocks, bonds or
commodity futures. Excluded is any transaction between the employee and the employee's
spouse or children as well as the transfer, purchase or sale of a personal residence. See also
id. § 209(1) (definition of income).
267. Id. § 202(a)(6)(B). The employee must report the names of people who paid him
compensation in excess of $5,000 in any of the two calendar years in which he first files a
report. The employee must also provide a brief description of the services performed. The
Act protects the lawyer-client privilege and requires the employee to be directly involved in
the provision of services. The employee must report any arrangements regarding future employment as well as leaves of absence from government service and continuation of pay-
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tions held.2es Because of the perception that gifts and income were
likely sources of conflicts of interest, considerable detail regarding
gifts and income is included in the Act. 269 The provisions, however,

are not all-inclusive. By placing limits upon what must be reported
under the Act, 270 Congress reduced the administrative burdens on
the employee and the intrusions into financial privacy. The
amount of information required to be reported under the Act reflects what Congress perceived to be the type of financial interests
likely to entail conflicts of interest.
Whether to require the reporting of the interests of spouses
and other relatives presented a difficult problem.27 1 While Congress viewed the privacy interests of spouses as being entitled to
special consideration, exclusion of spouses' interests opened a substantial possibility of evasion

272

The Act thus requires a spouse's

income to be reported, but Congress accommodated the spouse's
privacy interests in a number of ways.273
ments and benefits by previous employers.
268. Id. § 202(a)(6)(A). An employee must disclose all positions held as an officer, trustee, director, partner, employee, representative, proprietor, or consultant of any corporation,
firm, or business, including non-profit organizations. Excluded from reporting are honorary
positions and positions held in any religious, social, fraternal or political entity. Requiring
the reporting of positions held in these entities would constitute an improper invasion of the
first amendment rights of free association. See American Fed. of Gov't Employees v. Schlesinger, 443 F. Supp. 431, 434-35 (D.D.C. 1978) (challenge to internal reporting regulations).
269. 5 U.S.C. app. § 202(a)(2) (1982). See also supra note 264. The Act distinguishes
between gifts of food, lodging, transportation, entertainment and other gifts. Gifts of food,
lodging, transportation and entertainment are to be reported if gifts from any individual in
a calendar year total $250 or more. Other gifts are to be reported if gifts from any individual
in a calendar year total $100 or more. The employee must report the source, value and
description of the gift. Gifts from relatives are excluded.
270. See supra notes 264-69 and accompanying text.
271. Critics of inclusion of spouses' financial interests noted the altered role of women
in society and the modification of the marriage relationship. H.R. REP. No. 800, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 105 (1977); House JudiciaryHearingson H.R. 3249, supra note 257, at 35 (statement of Rep. E.W. Pattison).
272. House Judiciary Hearingson H.R. 1, supra note 260, at 45.
273. 5 U.S.C. app. § 202(e) (1982). There are five principal exemptions from the reporting requirements: 1) While the spouse's source of earned income exceeding $1,000 received
from any person must be reported, only the character of the employee's business need be
reported if the spouse is self-employed in a business or profession. 2) Gifts and reimbursements need not be reported if the spouse receives them independent of the spouse's relationship with the employee. 3) The employee need not report the spouse's property holdings, transactions, property, and liabilities if the employee certifies that the employee has no
knowledge of the financial interest, that it is not derived from the employee's assets or income, and that the employee does not derive any economic benefits from the financial interest. 4) No report of the spouse's financial interest is required if the spouse is living apart

518

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

Government departments and agencies raised objections during congressional consideration of the Act claiming that much of
the information being contemplated for inclusion should remain
confidential. They stressed privacy interests, the adverse effect on
recruitment, and the fear of abuse of the information. 4 While
Congress rejected confidentiality, the Ethics in Government Act
incorporates protections for reporting employees including review
of the report prior to disclosure, 27 5 destruction of reports after a
period of six years, 2 7' and penalties for use of the reports for un-

lawful purposes or for commercial purposes such as solicitation. 7
Congress sought to provide an enforcement structure and penalties that were sufficiently flexible to deal with both severe and
less egregious violations. As do many of the state provisions,7 8 the
from the employee with an intent to end the marriage or to have a permanent separation. 5)
Alimony and other payments related to divorce need not be reported.
Some state cases have addressed the requirement of reporting of spouse's financial interest. See, e.g., Lehrhaput v. Flynn, 129 N.J. Super. 327, 333, 323 A.2d 537, 541 (1974), aff'd,
740 N.J. Super. 250, 356 A.2d 35 (1976), aff'd, 75 N.J. 459, 383 A.2d 428 (1978) (striking
down a portion of a New Jersey statute requiring an employee to report the assets of a
spouse).
274. PrivacyInterests: House JudiciaryHearings on H.R. 3249, supra note 259, at 71
(testimony of M. Lawton, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen.), 107 (statement of R. Albrecht, Dep't of
Treas. General Counsel), 115 (testimony of R. Wiley, Dep't of Defense General Counsel),
112 (statement of C. Goodman, U.S. Civ. Serv. Comm. General Counsel); Adverse Effect on
Recruitment: House Judiciary Hearings on H.R. 3249, supra note 257, at 99 (testimony of
H. Pitt, SEC General Counsel); Fearof Abuse: House JudiciaryHearings on H.R. 1, supra
note 260, at 480 (statement of R. Keller, Deputy Comptroller General).
275. 5 U.S.C. app. § 206 (1982). An appropriate official must review the report and sign
it after determining that no conflict of interest was found. This official may request additional information. If, after notice and an opportunity to respond, the appropriate official
determines the report discloses a conflict of interest, the official may notify the employee of
steps that must be taken to resolve the conflict. Included in such steps are divestiture, restitution, establishment of a blind trust, voluntary transfer, reassignment, or resignation.
276. Id. § 205(d). Filed reports are destroyed after six years. Reports on unconfirmed
appointees or of unelected presidential and vice-presidential candidates are destroyed after
one year.
277. Id. § 205(f). Reports may not be obtained or used for unlawful purpo3es. The attorney general may bring a civil action against any person who misuses access to the reports
and may recover a penalty up to $5,000. Although only ten percent of the approximately
12,000 employees filing reports are political appointees, almost eighty percent of the requests concern political appointees. Most requests come from the media and public interest
groups. ETHICS ACT STUDY, supra note 257, app. I at 11-13.
278. Twenty-seven states have criminal remedies. See ALA. CODE § 36-25-27(a) (1975)
(maximum fine of $10,000 and maximum sentence of 10 years); ALASKA STAT. § 39.50.060(a)
(1977) (willful violation a misdemeanor; maximum fine $1,000 and maximum sentence six
months); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-544 (fine of $1,000 or 30 days in county jail maximum
penalty); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-1632 (1979) (maximum penalty $500 fine); CALIF. GoV'T
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Ethics in Government Act provides civil and administrative remeCODE

§ 91000(a)-(b) (West 1976 and Supp. 1983) (intentional violation a misdemeanor;

maximum penalty $10,000 or three times the amount unreported); COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-6-

202(7) (1982) (misdemeanor for willful violation; fine of not less than $1,000 and not more
than $5,000); CONN. GEN. STAT. 1-89 (Supp. 1983) (imprisonment up to one year and fine of
$1,000 for intentional violation); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1471(a)-(b) (1981 and Supp. 1982)
(maximum penalty 5 years and $5,000, but $10,000 for willful or intentional violations); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 112.317(6) (1978) (willful violation a misdemeanor of the first degree); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-107 (Smith-Hurd 1981) (willful violation a Class A misdemeanor); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 46-251 (1981) (failure to file a true statement a Class B misdemeanor); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 268B, § 5(f) (1982) (statement signed under penalty of
perjury); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 4.1701(175), (180) (Callaghan 1977) (midemeanor; $1,000 or
ninety days); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.10 (1977 and Supp. 1983) (knowing certification of
false information a felony); MIss. CODE ANN. § 25-4-31(3) (Supp. 1982) (knowing violation a
misdemeanor); NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-14, 126 (1978 and Supp. 1982) (Accountability & Disc.
Comm'n may pursue various criminal remedies); NEv. REv. STAT. § 281.581 (1979) (willful
failure to file a misdemeanor); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 102.06 (1978 and Supp. 1983) (Ethics
Comm'n may recommend prosecution); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 65-409(b) (Purdon Supp.
1982) (misdemeanor; $1,000 or one year maximum penalty); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-14-18
(Supp. 1980) (willful violation maximum penalty $500 and/or one year); S.C. CODE ANN. § 813-1010 (1977 and Supp. 1981) (willful violation a misdemeanor, maximum penalty $1,000
and/or 90 days); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 3-1A-6 (1980) (intentional violation a Class 2
misdemeanor); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-505 (1980) ($1,000 maximum fine); TEx. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 6252-9b(10) (Vernon Supp. 1982) (knowing violation a Class B misdemeanor); UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-16-12 (1978) (knowing violation a misdemeanor and incurs
removal from office); W. VA. CODE § 613-1-2 (1979) (intentional violation a misdemeanor
punishable by six months to one year confinement); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.58(1) (West 1972
and Supp. 1982) (intentional violation incurs fine of not less than $100 nor more than $5,000
and/or imprisonment of not more than one year in county jail).
Twenty-one states have civil or administrative remedies. See ALA. CODE § 36-25-27(c)
(1975) (criminal penalties do not preclude powers of agencies or com~missions to discipline
their employees); ALASKA STAT. § 39.50.070-.080 (1980) (failure to file can preclude confirmation, appointment, or collection of salary); CALiF. GoV'T CODE §§ 83116, 91001, 91004 (West
1976 & Supp. 1983) (cease and desist order; monetary penalties); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-88, 89(6) (West Supp. 1983) (civil penalty of $10 per day and agencies retain the power to
discipline); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5858(c) (1979) (State Personnel Comm'n may remove,
suspend, or take other disciplinary action); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.317(1)-(5) (West 1982 &
Supp. 1983) (civil penalties include removal, suspension, restitution and $5,000 fine); HAWAI
REV. STAT. § 84-19 (1976 & Supp. 1982) (att'y general authorized to void contracts where
necessary); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-107 (Smith-Hurd 1981) (failure to fie within the
prescribed time results in ineligibility for or forfeiture of the position); IND. CODE ANN. § 42-6-4(3) (Burns Supp. 1983) (State Ethics Comm'n shall recommend appropriate sanction or
remedy); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-1153 (West Supp. 1983) (civil penalties include removal,
suspension, and demotion); MD. ANN. CODE art. 40A, § 2-105(d)(8) (1982) (State Ethics
Comm'n shall recommend appropriate penalty); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268B, §§ 4, 5(c)
(West Supp. 1983) (State Ethics Comm'n may issue an appropriate order including civil
penalty not exceeding $2,000); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 4.1701(171) (1977) (criminal penalties do
not limit the powers of other governmental bodies to discipline their employees); NEB. REv.
STAT. §§ 49-14, 126 (1978 & Supp. 1982) (Accountability & Disclosure Comm'n may pursue
various civil penalties); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-16-14(B) (1978) (dismissal, demotion, or sus-
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dies as well as criminal penalties for violations of the Act.21 9 The

Act also establishes an Office of Government Ethics to fulfill enforcement and review responsibilities.8
Constitutional challenges to state public financial disclosure
provisions have rested upon allegations that the provisions violated
employees' rights to privacy, rights of free association, rights
against self-incrimination, and the right to equal protection under
the law. Challenges based upon the constitutional right to privacy
have failed either because the courts have found that public employees' financial interests are not protected by a constitutional
right to privacy, 281 or because a compelling state interest justifies
infringement upon the right of privacy. 2s 2 Challenges upon equal
pension); N.Y. PuB. OFF.LAW § 74(4) (McKinney Supp. 1982) (violators may be fined, suspended or removed from office); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 102.06 (Page 1978 & Supp. 1983)
(Ethics Comm'n shall make appropriate recommendation); R.I. GEN. LAws 36-14-13 (Supp.
1982) (Conflict of Interest Comm'n shall recommend penalty); VA. CODE 2.1-628 (Supp.
1983) (may forfeit office or employment) WASH. REv. CODE. ANN. § 42.17.390 (Supp. 1983)
(penalties include fines of $10,000 or ten dollars per day of tardiness); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
19.58(2) (West Supp. 1982) (criminal penalties do not limit the powers of a department to
discipline employees).
279. 5 U.S.C. app. § 204 (1982). A civil penalty not to exceed $5,000 is provided for a
knowing or willful failure to file or for a knowing or willful falsification. In addition, administrative penalties are provided for failure to file, for falsification, for failure to provide additional information, and for failure to take steps to eliminate a discovered conflict. The General Accounting Office found that agencies "have made little use of the administrative
enforcement authority given them by the [Ethics in Government Act of 1978]." ETHICS ACT
STUDY, supra note 257, at 5.

280. 5 U.S.C. app. § 401 (1982) The Office has enforcement and review responsibilities,
including the responsibility to provide and publish advisory opinions, id. § 402. Rules and
regulations are to be made after notice and comment and the Act gives any person standing
to seek judicial review of a regulation, id. § 404.
281. See Gideon v. Alabama State Ethics Comm'n, 379 So. 2d 570 (Ala. 1980); Goldtrap
v. Askew, 334 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1976); Illinois State Employees Ass'n v. Walker, 57 Ill.
2d 512,
315 N.E.2d 9, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1058 (1974); Montgomery County v. Walsh, 274 Md.
502, 336 A.2d 97 (1975), appeal dismissed, 424 U.S. 901 (1976); Snider v. Shapp, 45 Pa.
Commw. 337, 405 A.2d 602 (1979); In re Kading, 70 Wisc. 2d 508, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975);
see also Opinion of the Judges to the Senate, 375 Mass. 795, 376 N.E.2d 810 (1978) (advisory opinion that public officers can be required to make financial disclosures without violating their right of privacy); Kenny v. Bryne, 144 N.J. Super. 243, 365 A.2d 211 (1976)
(executive order requiring state employees to make financial disclosures held not to violate
their right of privacy), aff'd, 75 N.J. 458, 383 A.2d 428 (1978). Contra,Dunphy v. Sheehan,
92 Nev.259, 549 P.2d 332 (1976) (financial disclosure provisions in state ethics act held
unconstitutionally vague).
282. See County of Nevada v. MacMillen, 11 Cal. 3d 662, 522 P.2d 1345, 114 Cal. Rptr.
345 (1974); Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d 275, 517 P.2d 911, appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 902
(1974). See also Slevin v. City of New York, 551 F. Supp. 917, 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (employee's privacy not violated by financial disclosure to city government).
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protection, 28 3 due process,""' or the right against self-incrimination 28 5 have likewise generally failed. It is clear, therefore, that
public financial disclosure laws resolve the conflict between access
and privacy in favor of access. This judgment rests upon the perceived importance of the values involved in this specific area of
disclosure.
4. Reconciliation of the conflict between accountability and
personal privacy. The conflict between public access to governmental information and employee privacy exposes basic judicial
perceptions concerning the character of public employment which
warrant re-evaluation. Articulation of employee privacy interests
requires courts to"assess the character of public employment. Absent constitutional restraints, the courts' characterization depends
upon how much of the public character of government business is
to be imputed to the acts of the individual employee. The more
willing a court is to conclude that issues regarding public employees legitimately elicit public scrutiny, the less likely a court is to
require specific or exceptional reasons for the interest in the activities of a particular public employee. 8 8
Historically, the rights of public employees have been most
often discussed in the face of action by a governmental unit
against the employee. In this context, the recognition of the rights
of public employees led to the abandonment of the concept that
public employment was a privilege along with the rejection of the
belief that public employees, by accepting their positions, waived
rights that other citizens enjoyed.2 87 Open government laws once
again force the courts to confront the propriety of intrusions upon
individual interests permitted solely on the basis of the person's
status as a government employee. Not surprisingly, given the
strong policies supporting public access and the ambiguity of the
individual rights invaded, courts have perceived the character of
public employment as being fundamentally different than that of
283. See supra cases cited at note 262.
284. Stein v. Howlett, 52 Ill. 2d 570, 289 N.E.2d 409 (1972), appeal dismissed, 412 U.S.
925 (1973); Montgomery County v. Walsh, 274 Md. 502, 336 A.2d 97 (1975), appeal dismissed, 424 U.S. 901 (1976).
285. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965) (public employees are not a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities).
286. See supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text.
287. See generally, D. ROSENBLOOM, FEDERAL SERVICE AND THE CONSTITUTION (1971).
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private employment. Public financial disclosure by public employees illustrates that significant intrusions into the privacy of public
employees follow from justifications resting upon the public's need
to understand and to police official conduct. Public financial disclosure provisions link the general policies favoring access to the
affairs of individual employees.
CONCLUSION

Judicial decisions interpreting the relationship between open
government laws and public employment provisions provide an insightful perspective from which to examine these two important
substantive bodies of law. This perspective presents views of each
body of law that otherwise would be difficult to acquire. The relationship between the two bodies of law also exposes common policies and purposes which provide principles for further
reconciliation.
In areas such as government investigation of applicants and
employees, requests for information regarding employees, and public financial disclosure, legislative bodies often have directly addressed the relationship between the two bodies of law. While legislative accommodation of competing values often has left
considerable ground for dispute, it can be fairly said that judicial
decisions reflect the policy judgments of the legislatures. In other
areas, such as labor management relations and personnel actions,
legislative determinations are less clear. While the statutes may
address specific problems, they do not contain judgments directed
to the reconciliation of the conflicting policies contained in public
employment provisions and open government laws.
Judicial decisions in all four areas reviewed, however, offer discernable patterns because the two bodies of law address similar
problems. The history of the two bodies of law illustrates that open
government provisions seek to provide public understanding of the
operations of government and thereby encourage public participation in government and provide a method of official accountability.
The history of public employment laws shows that public employment provisions seek to encourage the fair and efficient administration of government. Underlying these provisions to encourage
the fair and efficient administration of government is the concept
of personal responsibility and accountability. Open government
laws and public employment provisions both concern democratic
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control of public bureaucracies. The two bodies of law address similar questions, such as how individuals within the organization can
be held responsible for their conduct, how the public should be
involved in the administration of public programs, and to what
protections public employees should be entitled. A brief examination of these questions demonstrates common concerns yet also illustrates specific conflicts reflected in the litigated cases.
Public employment provisions seek to ensure that pay, promotion, and discipline turn upon evaluation of an individual's performance. This evaluation rests primarily in the hands of the public employer. Public employment provisions provide but a small
role for the citizen in the evaluation of individual employees. Open
government provisions, on the other hand, focus upon accountability through public access to information regarding official actions.
This evaluation, however, often requires information regarding individual employees. Therefore, open government provisions clash
not only with the privacy rights of the individual employee but
also with the employee's expectations that evaluation will remain
in the hands of the public employer.
Open government laws and public employment provisions address the protection of employee rights differently. Public employment provisions protect individual employees because protection is
necessary to ensure that public employers exercise their authority
over personnel in a manner which furthers the purposes for which
it was granted. Unbridled discretion of public officials would limit
the ability of legal rules to structure and to control public employment. Open government provisions define employee rights principally as restrictions upon public access. Therefore, employees have
been markedly unsuccessful in using open government provisions
to alter the character of the employment relationship or the restraints placed upon the public employer. Only when the restraint
is clearly required by the open government provision have the
courts been willing to act to provide protection. Because employee
rights are viewed as restrictions upon public access, courts have
been willing to define employee interests narrowly.
Legislation within the two areas requires judicial reconciliation, not only because of the conflicting policies, but also because
legislatures have often failed to understand that the two areas address similar questions. The spate of legislation in both areas in
recent years reflects a growing anxiety about the power of public
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bureaucracies and a desire to impose legal restraints upon them.
The next generation of legislative initiatives demands a recognition
of the commonality of concerns expressed in open government laws
and public employment provisions, along with a willingness to alter
both areas to fit a general theory of the regulation of official
conduct.

